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Jurisdiction herein

conferred upon

Rule 3(a) and Rule 4(a) of

the Rules

tlhe Court of Appeals by

of Utah

Court of Appeals,

Article VIII, Section 5, of the Utah Constiitution and Section 784-11, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.

STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

This

is

an

appeal

from

the

judgment

rendered

by

Honorable David W. Sorenson of the Second Oircuit Court of the
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the

was held

regarding the

above-stated matter on July 6, 1987, and

the defendant's motion for dismissal after the appellant had
completed its case, was granted

by

tried

physical

control

41-6-44(1)

Utah

for

being

in

violation of Section
amended.

On

the

6th

day

of

the

Court.
of
Code

a

The defendant
motor vehicle in

Annotated

1953, as

July, 1987, the above case was

presented to the judge without a jury.

Appellant seeks reversal

of the Circuit Court's decision.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE

THAT
SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE
EXISTED
TO SUSTAIN A
CONVICTION OF
THE RESPONDENT
INDEPENDENT OF THE
INTOXILYZER RESULTS, AND BY DISMISSING THE STATE'S CASE
ON THE BASIS OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND/OR REQUIRING
THE OFFICER TO STATE SPECIFICALLY THE ULTIMATE FACTS,
WAS ABUSE OF COURT DISCRETION, MAKING THE DECISION
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND ORDINANCES
A.

Utah

Code

Annotated,

Section

41-6-44(1),

1953, as

amended.
B.

State v. Petree, 659 P. 2d 443, 444-45 (Utah 1983).

C.

In the Interest of I. , R. L. , 61 U. A. R 48 (Utah 1987).

D.

State v. Chambers, 533 P. 2d 876, 879 (Utah 1979).

£.

Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P. 2d 778 (Utah 1986).
-2-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE)

In the early morning hours of June 5, 198 7, Officer Joe Yonk
and Officer Spence Anderson were on routinq patrol
Utahf area.

The

officers were

traveling westbound on the west
a\ yellow

side of the Hyrum Dam when they observed
parked off

the shoulder

in the Hyrum,

of the

Ford Maverick

road approximately two to three

feet (TR p. 5). The officers observed

an individual

behind the

wheel with his head leaning toward the window (TR p. 36).
The

officers

pulled

behind

and

toi the side of the Ford

Maverick and Officer Anderson, who was a paissenger
vehicle, went

to the

Ford Maverick to cheick on the condition of

the driver (TR pp. 5, 37). The driver was
wheel,
officer

the

keys

noticed

awake and

behind the

were

in

the ignition oif the vehicle, and the

signs

of

impairment

Respondent, Michael

Chugg, and

asi he

could smell

coming from his breath (TR pp. 5, 6,
officers also

in the patrol

talked

to

the

and odor of alcohol

12, 212, 23, 40,

44). The

noticed that the speech of t|he Respondent was slow

and not normal (TR p. 40). Officer Anderson had the suspect exit
the

vehicle

noticing

that

unstable (TR p. 40). The
patrol

car

where

the

the

Respondeat appeared to be very

suspect
officer

moved

to

the

front

of the

proceeded to administer several

field sobriety tests (TR p. 6).
While
tests,

the

Officer

officer
Yonk

was

exited

administering

the

the

walked

-3-

vehicle^

field sobriety
over to the

suspect's vehicle, and observed the keys
44).

At

this

time

ignition (TR p.

Officer Anderson requested the Respondent

perform three field sobriety
performed was

in the

that of

tests (TR

p. 6).

The

first test

that horizontal gaze nystagmus (TR p. 7).

The officer explained this test to the Respondent (TR p. 8). The
officer

then

stated

smooth pursuit in

that

both

the Respondent's eyes lacked that of

eyes

and

his

eyes

jerked

at maximum

deviation (TR p. 8).
The next

test requested

was that of the walk and
explained

this

test

to be

turn

to

test

the

performed by the Respondent
(TR

p.

Respondent

9).

and

The officer

asked

him if he

understood it (TR p. 10). He replied that he did (TR pp. 8, 10).
The officer indicated that the Respondent was unable to place his
right foot in front of his left foot and to perform the
turn

test

(TR

pp.

9,

10).

walk and

The officer also stated that the

Respondent was very unstable on

his

feet

and

swayed

back and

forth as well as side to side (TR p. 10).
The third

field sobriety

test the Respondent was requested

to perform was that of the one leg stand and balance (TR

p. 10).

The officer demonstrated this test and asked the Respondent if he
understood it
11).

and the

Respondent responded

that he

did (TR p.

The officer observed that the Respondent could not lift his

foot off the ground for more than two
Respondent

tried

to

count,

keeping

seconds (TR
his

toes

p. 11).
on

The

the ground

contrary to the instructions given by the officer (TR p. 11).
After the

field

sobriety

tests, officer

Anderson

placed the

Respondent under arrest for being in physical control of a

-4-

vehicle

while

intoxicated

pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Annotated,

Section 41-6-44(1), (1953, as amended) (TRl pp. 12, 13, 14).
defendant

told

the

officers

occasions (TR pp. 16,
thought

he

was

that

19, 20).

under

the

he had been drinking on two
Res pondent stated

The

that he

o f an alcoholic beverage

influence

according to the results of the

The

intoxilyzer test

results (TR p.

20).
Officer Joe

Yonk observed

two of

the field sobriety tests

that were being administered by Officer Anderson, the heel to toe
and

the

balance

test

(TR

37, 38 ) .

pp.

testified that the Respondent was unable
(TR

p. 39).

Also

in

intoxicated

an alcoholic

however,

(TR pp.

at

intoxilyzer

the
was

14, 39,

time

and

beverage (TR

was transferred to the Cache County
breath test

the

breath

of

40).

trial,

unavailable

prepared.
intoxilyzer

sample

(TR

from

the

The Court indicated,
samples

either test

had

p. 39)

the
pp.

under the

?he Respondent
the

The breath

taking

of a

test was taken;

4xPert

witness

on the

49-50).

Also, the

time after

the taking

Respondent

in

not

definitely

Jail I for

intoxilyzer certificate for the period of
of

o perform

Court both officers testified that the

Respondent was obviously
influence of

Officer Yonk also

had

not yet been

its fi indings,

that because

been

adnjitted

into

evidence,

indicating the blood alcohol, content that it could not find that
the Respondent

was in

physical control o^ a vehicle while under

the influence of alcohol (TR pp.58, 59, 61)
-5-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The lower Court abused its discretion
of the

facts pertaining

in its interpretation

to intoxication of the Respondent.

The

lower Court held that because the Appellant was unable to present
the

intoxilyzer

test

record

evidence independent of the

results

same to

there was not sufficient

render a

decision beyond a

reasonable doubt as to the intoxication of the Respondent.
It is

the contention of the Appellant that the Court abused

its discretion in requiring the Appellant witness to testify that
the Respondent
when both
alcohol in

was "incapable

officers

testified

of safely
he

was

operating the vehicle"
under

the

influence of

their professional opinion and when such a result can

be drawn from the evidence presented

to

the

Court.

That the

Court has abused its discretion in its interpretation of the case
law, code sections, and facts regarding the impaired
sufficient evidence

driver when

existed to find the Respondent guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt.

-6-

ARGUMENT

THAT SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE
EXISTED! TO
SUSTAIN A
CONVICTION OF
THE RESPONDENT
INDEPENDENT OF THE
INTOXILYZER RESULTS, AND BY DISMISSING THE STATE'S CASE
ON THE BASIS OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND/OR REQUIRING
THE OFFICER TO STATE SPECIFICALLY THE ULTIMATE FACTS,
WAS ABUSE OF COURT DISCRETION, MAKING THE DECISION
ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.

In the case of
1975), the

State vs.

Supreme Court

used, and

is

not

shown

Chambers, $33

P2 876,

879 (Utah

held that "if discretion is reasonably
to

abused,

trial

court

disturbed."

The facts indicate without any evidence to rebut the
in

the

opinion

experience of over twelve
operator of

the

arbitrary, or

the

that

of

been

capricious,

same

judgment

have

of

should

not be

two offiders, with the combined

years,

the

Respondent,

who

was the

the vehicle and in physical cointrol of the same, was

intoxicated and according to

the

more

experienced

officer was

"obviously" intoxicated at the time of the ptop.
The testimony
alcohol coming

from

officers noticed
showed signs
signs, Officer

before the Court indicated an obvious odor of
the

that his

person

of

the

Respondent,

that the

demeanor and physical characteristics

of intoxication.

As

Anderson requested

field sobriety tests:
(1)

Gaze Nystagmus

(2)

Heel to Toe

(3)

Stand and Balance
-7-

a result

of receiving these

the Respondent

to take three

After the Respondent attempted to perform the above
it was

the opinion

three tests,

of the Officer that he was unable to perform

the tests in a satisfactory manner.

As a direct

result, Officer

Anderson placed the Respondent under arrest.
After

the

Officer

placed

the Respondent under arrest and

transported him to the Cache County
would take

an intoxilyzer

Jail

test which

and

he did.

gave Respondent his constitutional rights.
report form,

he asked

included whether or not

him a

asked

According to

thought

if he

Officer Anderson

series of questions.

Respondent

him

he

One question

was

influence of an alcoholic beverage or drugs now."

the DUI

"under the

The Respondent

stated, "I guess so according to the tests."
In the Court findings

on

Page

59, of

the

transcript it

stated:
"Now, we have Officer Anderson, who testified that
he felt that he was under the influence of alcohol,
and Deputy Yonk, a veteran of many years on the
force, saying that he felt that he was under the
influence of alcohol; in fact, I believe he used
little stronger words than that, that he was
definitely under the influence of alcohol.

And

that presents the dilemma to the Court, quite
frankly.
I suppose if we look at Mr. Judd's argument in
this particular case, that was he under the
influence of alcohol at the time he left Ogden
and he's now coming down, or did he have such
-8-

a stiff drink that when he was sitting there,
he was coming up?

We don't have any testimony

one way or another as to that, at legist at this
point in time.

The motion is simply lone to

dismiss on the basis that the State has failed
to meet its burden of proof and especially as
cited under the Bugger case."
It is

the position

of the

Appellant appears

to the State

that the Court has abused its discretion irj relying upon argument
of counsel

which is

not evidence

before the

Court rather than

relying upon the evidence pertaining to intoxication at
the

officers

were

at

the

scene

administering the field sobriety
upon the

argument of

tests,

counsel rather

which have been presented with

of

the

the

the time

crime

For the

and

were

Court to rely

thanl the evidence or facts

witneslses

being

subject to

cross examination is clearly abuse of discretion.
The Court went on to state on Page 60 pf the transcript:
"But in this case, I just have a naggi ng—I have a
there's no
n doubt
nagging feeling on the one hand,, there's
about the question the defendant was there, and he
had—he was an impaired driver in a sense; and on
the other hand, I have a nagging question is that
nobody's told me that he was incapable of safely
operating the vehicle.

Now, I've gone through the

test, looked at the test, the only test offered by
the officers, which is designed, by its very creation,
is to give a percentage of blood alcohol is
-9-

the gaze Nystagmus.

That's the only one that I

know of, all the rest of them are subjective.
I'm not convinced that the balance test is a valid
test for anybody.

I find it, and I observed this

myself among many judges that are sober as a judge,
in a judicial conference, that had extreme difficulty
using the balance test, holding one foot up and
trying to count, it's very hard, especially at night.
The other test was the heel-toe or walk-turn and
obviously, the defendant did poorly on that one.
Does that rise to the level that this person w a s —
that would render this person incapable of safely
operating the vehicle?

I don't know, and when I'm

not sure, I am not convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt.

And if that's the level of proof at this

point in time, at least at the end of the State's
case, I think that the motion is well taken, and
therefore, grant the same."
It is

clear from the facts that sufficient evidence existed

for the Court
alcohol at

to

find

the time

the

he was

Defendant

under

by the

Court above

to the

the

The Appellant or

are not required to testify to all of the ultimate

facts when there is a sufficient quantum of
that

ultimate fact

that is "nobody's told me that he

was incapable of safely operating the vehicle."
its witnesses

influence of

in physical control of the vehicle.

The fact that the officers did not testify
as stated

the

operator

of

the

vehicle
-10-

evidence to indicate

was impaired and under the

influence

of

alcohol

testified that
conclusion that
the Court

at

this was

the

the case.

because the

that he

time,

feoth

clearly

For tne Court to come to the

officers had

is incapable

officers

not specifically told

of safely operating the vehicle

the Court has abuse of discretion to deny or disregard all of the
other evidence

and refuse

Even the statement of the

to make

this conclusion

Defendant,

himself,

to

on its own.
the officers

that he was under the influence of alcohol coupled with
the

two

officers

who

were

at

the

scene

should

have

been

sufficient to indicate the intoxication of the Respondent and his
capability to operate a vehicle safely.
According

to

Section

41-6-44(1)(a)4

Utah

Code Annotated

(1953 as amended) the statute in which the Respondent was charged
was pled in the alternative, .08 and/or operating while under the
influence of alcohol.

Utah Code Annotated, Section

41-6-44(1)(a):
"It is unlawful and punishable as prov|ided in this
Section for any person to operate or be in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this state if
the person has a breath alcohol conte|nt of .08% or
greater by weight as shown by a chemi cal test given
within two hours after the alleged operation or
physical control, or if the person is under the
influence of alcohol and any drug or the combined
influence of alcohol in any drug to a degree which
render the person incapable of safely operating a
vehicle."

-11-

The evidence presented to
the

issues

influence
vehicle*

of

of

whether

alcohol

or
and

the Courtf

not

the

incapable

all went

directly to

Respondent

was under the

of

operating the

safely

For the Court to dismiss the Appellant's action because

the officers did
pertained in

not

specifically

state

or

use

the language

the code section of incapable of safely operating a

vehicle is abuse of discretion in

the Court's

interpretation of

the facts which it has been presented with.
The Utah

Court of

Appeals In the Interest Of: I. y R. L., a

Person under Eighteen Years,
July 15,

1987) held

61 Utah

that an

individual may

Section 41-6-44 Utah Annotated 1953
when there
Court

of

is sufficient
Appeals

held

Advance Reports

aside

48f (Utah

be found guilty of

from

the

blood test

evidence to sustain a conviction.
that,

"It

is

well

settled

The

that the

reviewing Court has the power to review a case on the sufficiency
of evidence."

Within the body of In The Interest of: I.,

R. L.,

supra, the Court cited State vs. Petree, 659 Pacific 2d 443, 44445 (Utah 1983) where the Utah
the

fabric

of

evidence

Supreme Court

against

the

indicated that when

Defendant covers the gap

between the presumption of innocence and the proof

of guilt that

the reviewing

Court may find a sufficient amount of evidence for

a conviction.

However, the Court did state, "that this does mean

that the Court can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap
in order to sustain

a verdict.

utmost limits, must be

The

evidence stretched

to its

sufficient to prove the Defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt."

The Appellant readily accepts this
-12-

burden and suggests that there

is

sufficient

evidence

to show

that the Court abused its discretion in granting the Respondent's
Motion to Dismiss.
In State vs. Petree, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held that
in

"reviewing

the

evidence

reasonably drawn that if

and

all

reasonable

inferences

minds

could

which may be
not entertain

reasonable doubt that the Appellant committed the crime for which
he was convicted and that the evidentiary fabric need not even be
stretched to come to this conclusion".
The Court found in In the Interest of; I, R. L., supra, that
there was sufficient evidence and that the Iblood
be cumulative.

test would only

It is the position of the Appellant, based on the

evidence in this case, that the blood testsi would be no more than
cumulative evidence

to indicate that the Respondent was impaired

and unable to safely operate a motor vehicle.
In the Court's final
that

a

Gaze

Nystagmus

analysis
field

and

test

findings,

it indicated

is a valid test but yet it

appears refused to give any weight to the s£me.
The balance test was basically thrown
not given

any weight

based upon

out by

the fact

the Judge and

that the

Judge at a

judicial conference had extreme difficulty In performing the test
when he

was not

intoxicated.

that maybe the Judge

The Appellant

is, along

with

other

is not contending
people,

perform this test completely in a sober condition.
looking at the totality of the evidence and
that were

given as

part of

the field

However, when

the other

two tests

sojpriety test, it is the

ability of the individual to follow the instructions
-13-

unable to

and attempt

to perform

the test

explained that

as closely

as possible

indicates whether

rhe Respondent

not and thus could safety operate a vehicle.
presently

before

the

Court

as the officer has

indicate

The facts

that

the Respondent was

unable to do so and for the Court to unilaterally
out because

of the

Court's inability

judicial conference ignores the

to perform

facts which

is impaired or

throw the test
the test at a

have been presented

before it and make such an arbitrary and capricious decision.
The Court's

findings indicate in regards to the heel to toe

or the walk and turn test the Defendant
the same.

obviously did

However, when the Court isolated this test as the only

test there was a valid test, it was not convinced
dismiss the

poorly on

Defendant's motion

that it should

because of one test given by the

officers that in the Court's opinion was valid.
It is the position of
Court's reasoning,

and the

the

Appellant

that

based

upon the

facts in this matter, that the Court

made an arbitrary and capricious decision and did so as

a result

of abuse of its judicial discretion.
In

light

of

the

above

reasoning, Appellant respectfully

submits that the lower Court abused its discretion and its

-14-

interpretations of the facts and how the facts

should be applied

to Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44(1)(^) (1953 as amended).

CONCLUSION

The Appellant respectfully submits th^t the decision made by
the Circuit Court Judge is arbitrary
abused

its

discretion

in

and capricious

granting

Dismiss after the Appellant had rested.
the

Respondent's

information
submitted as

or

Motion,
arguments

it
of

and that it

the Respondent's Motion to
For

would

have

counsel

who

the Court
had
was

to

to grant
rely

not

upon

properly

evidence to be given weight a|t this particular time

of the trial stage.

Appellant

respectfully

requests

that the

Utah Court of Appeals reverse the judgment lof the lower court and
remand the matter for a new trial.
Respectflully submitted,

>R" BURBl^NK
:ache County Attorney
fy for the State of Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed

a true

and correct

copy of

the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF to C. DeMont Judd, Attorney for
Defendant, at 2650 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah 84401.
DATED this

22c/

day of September, 198 7.

B URBAN K
che County Attorney
for the State of Utah
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41-6-43.10.

Motor Vehicles

penalties, or that governs any combination of those
matters, shall be consistent with the provisions in
this code which govern those matters.
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority
that governs reckless driving, or operating a vehicle
in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of
persons or property shall be consistent with the
provisions of this code which govern those matters,
Ml
41-6-43.10. Repealed.
IMS
41-6-44. Driving under the Influence of alcohol
or drug or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol
content • Measurement of blood or breath
alcohol - Criminal punishment • Arrest without
warrant • Penalties • Suspension or revocation
of license.
OXs) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in
this section for any person to operate or be in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the
person has a blood or breath alcohol content of
,08^b or greater by weight as shown by a chemical
test given within two hours after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the person is under
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree
which renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled to use
alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge
of violating this section.
(2) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall
be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 cubic centimeters of blood, and the percent by weight of
alcohol in the breath shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3)(a) Every person who is convicted the first time
of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor. But if the person has inflicted a
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of
having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner,
he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is
that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that
degree of care which an ordinarily reasonable and
prudent person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(4) In addition to any penalties imposed under
Subsection (3), the court shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less
than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours,
with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the
jail, or require the person to work in a communityservice work program for not less than 24 hours nor
more than 50 hours and, in addition to the jail
sentence or the work in the community-service
work program, order the person to participate in an
assessment and educational series at a licensed
alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(5Xa) Upon a second conviction within five years
after a first conviction under this section or under a
local ordinance similar to this section adopted in
compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court
shall, in addition to any penalties imposed under
Subsection (3), impose a mandatory jail sentence of
not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than
720 hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk
tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a
community-service work program for not less than
80 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition
to the jail sentence or the work in the communityservice work program, order the person to partici-
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pate in an assessment and educational series at a
licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility. The court
may, in its discretion, order the person to obtain
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five
years after a second conviction under this section or
under a local ordinance similar to this section
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-643(1), the court shall, in addition to any penalties
imposed under Subsection (3), impose a mandatory
jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than
2,160 hours with emphasis on serving in the drunk
tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a
community-service work project for not less than
240 nor more than 720 hours and, in addition to the
jail sentence or work in the community-service
work program, order the person to obtain treatment
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under
Subsection (3) may be suspended and the convicted \
person is not eligible for parole or probation until J
any sentence imposed under this section has been
served. Probation or parole resulting from a convi-«
ction for a violation of this section or a local ordi-|
nance similar to this section adopted in compliance i
with Subsection 41-6-43(1) may not be terminated 5
and the department may not reinstate any license*:
suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction, ;5
if it is a second or subsequent conviction within fivel
years, until the convicted person has funiished evi-|
dence satisfactory to the department that all fines;
and fees, including fees for restitution arid rehabil-j
itation costs, assessed against the person, have beeni

paid.

:f

(6Xa) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5)1
that require a sentencing court to order a convictedi
person to: participate in an assessment and educat-*
tonal series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation faci4
iity; obtain, in the discretion of the court, treatment^
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; or obtain, |
mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation;;
facility, or do any combination of those things*?
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 4U\
6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Sub*|
ection (7). The court is required to render the same!
order regarding education or treatment at an alcohol^
rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection with aj
first, second, or subsequent conviction under^
Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense'!
under Subsection (7), as the court would render in*
connection with applying respectively, the first, j
second, or subsequent conviction requirements o £
Subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5).
(b) For purposes of determining Whether atf
conviction under Section 41-6-45 which qualified!
as a prior conviction under Subsection (7), is a firsCj
second, or subsequent conviction under this subset
ction, a previous conviction under either this section5:
or Section 41-6-45 is considered a prior con vie-tion.
(c) Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any,
community-based or other education program
provided for in this section shall be approved by the]
4
Department of Social Services.
(7)(a) When the prosecution agrees to la plea
guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation o f
Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under
Subsection 41-6-43(1) in satisfaction of, or as a*
substitute for, an original charge of a violation of
this section, the prosecution shall state; for the;
record a factual basis for the plea including'.
whether or not there had been consumption of*
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alcohol or drugs, or a combination o f both, by the
defendant in connection with the offense. The statement is an offer of proof of the facts which shows
whether there was consumption of alcohol or drugs,
or a combination of both, by the defendant, in
connection with the offense.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before
accepting the plea offered under this subsection o f
i he consequences of a violation of Section 41-645 as follows: If the court accepts the defendant's
plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of violating
Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for the
record that there was consumption of alcohol or
drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant
in connection with the offense, the resulting conviction is a prior offense for the purposes o f Subsection (5).
(c) The court shall notify the department o f
each conviction o f Section 41-6-45 which is a
prior offense for the purposes o f Subsection (5).
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest
a person for a violation of this section when the
officer has probable cause to believe the violation
has occurred, although not in his presence, and if
the officer has probable cause to believe that the
violation was committed by the person.
(9) The department of Public Safety shall suspend
for 90 days the operator's license of any person
convicted for the first time under Subsection (1),
and shall revoke for one year the license o f any
person otherwise convicted under this section, except
that the department may subtract from any suspension period the number of days for which a license
was previously suspended under Section 41-2-130
if the previous suspension was based on the same
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is
based.
Ml
41-6-44.1. (Effective January 1, 19*8).

41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in
actions for driving under the influence - Weight
of evidence.
(1) In any action or proceeding in which it is
material to prove that a person was operating or in
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the
results of a chemical test or tests as authorized in
Section 41-6-44.10 are admissible as evidence.
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two
hours after the alleged driving or actual physical
control, the test result is admissible as evidence of
the person's blood or breath alcohol level at the
time of the alleged operating or actual physical
control, but the trier of fact shall determine what
weight is given to the result of the test.
(3) This section does not prevent a court from
receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level
at the time of the alleged operating or actual physical control.
19S7
41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys for specified
offenses may prosecute for driving while license
suspended or revoked.
Alleged violations of Section 41-2-136, which
consist of the person operating a vehicle while his
operator's license is suspended or revoked for a
violation of Section 41-6-44, a local ordinance
which complies with the requirements of Section 416-43. Section 41-6-44.10, Section 76-5-207,
or a criminal prohibition that the person was
charged with violating as a result of a plea bargain
after having been originally charged with violating
one or more of those sections or ordinances, may be
prosecuted by attorneys of cities and towns as well
as by prosecutors who are empowered elsewhere in
this code to prosecute those alleged violations.
im
41-6-44.10. (Effective through December 31,
Procedures - Adjudicative proceedings.
The Department of Public Safety shall comply i 1987). -Implied consent to chemical tests for
alcohol or drug - Number of tests • Refusal •
with the procedures and requirements of Chapter
Warning, report - Hearing, revocation of license
46b, Title 63, in its adjudicative proceedings.
\m
• Appeal • Person incapable of refusal 41-6-44.2. Repealed.
lfts
Results of test available - Who may give test 41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis
Evidence.
• Evidence.
,(l)(a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this
(1) The commissioner of the Department of
Public Safety shall establish standards for the state is considered to have given his consent to a
administration and interpretation of chemical anal- chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine
for the purpose of determining whether he was
ysis of a person's breath, including standards o f
operating or in actual physical control of a motor
training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol
content statutorily prohibited, or while under the
material to prove that a person was operating or in
influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, if
influence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a
the test is or tests are administered at the direction
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibof a peace officer having grounds to believe that
ited, documents offered as memoranda or records o f
person to have been operating or in actual physical
acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis
control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or
was made and the instrument used was accurate,
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or
according to standards established in Subsection (1),
while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or
are admissible if:
combination of alcohol and any drug under Section
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the
regular course of the investigation at or about the 41-6-44.
(b) The peace officer determines which of the
time of the act, condition, or event; and
tests are administered and how many of them, shall
(b) the source of information from which made
be administered. If an officer requests more than
and the method and circumstances o f their preparone test, refusal by a person to take one or more
ation indicate their trustworthiness.
requested tests, even though he does submit to any
(3) If the judge finds that the standards establiother requested test or tests, is a refusal under this
shed under Subsection (1) and the conditions of
section.
Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption
(c) A person who has been requested under this
that the test results are valid and further foundation
for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary.
im section to submit to a chemical test or tests of his
foot* Co
*<*<>. Utah
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IN T H E
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
In the interest of I., R.L.
A Person under Eighteen Years
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood and Bench.
No. 860184-CA
FILED: July 15,19S7
THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE
Hon. Leslie D. Brown
ATTORNEYS:
John L. Chidester for Appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Bruce M. Hale, Joseph
E. Tesch for Respondent.
OPINION
GARFF, Judge:
RLI appeals from a juvenile court finding
chat he violated Utah Code Ann. 941
(1977) by driving while intoxicated. The cot
.fined him $150.00, ordered him to pay S100.<
into the Victim's Restitution Fund, ant
revoked his driving privileges for ninety days.
On May 12, 1985, appellant RLI was involved in a head-on collision which injured th<
driver of the other vehicle. Two investigating!
peace officers concluded that because he was
alone in the vehicle he was the driver, and that
he was under the influence of alcohol because!
of his speech, behavior, and alcoholic odor.
The investigating officers sent him to the I
Wasatch County Hospital in an ambulance,
but did not place him under arrest. At the
hospital, a third officer also failed to place
him under arrest. A medical technician assisted this third officer by taking a blood
sample from appellant. The officer, however,
did noc inform appellant that the purpose of
the blood test was to determine his blood
alcohol content.
At trial, appellant's counsel moved to suppress the blood test results. The court denied
the motion to suppress and found that on May
12, 1985, the juvenile operated a motor vehicle
under the influence of an intoxicant.
I
The first issue in this case is whether the
blood test result should have been excluded as
the product of an unconstitutional search and
seizure. The purpose of constitutional provisions against unreasonable searches and seizures is to protect personal privacy and dignity
against unwarranted intrusion by the state.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646-53, 81
S.Ct. 1684, 86-90, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961).
The fourth amendment of the U. S. Constit-

Code • Co

ution protects against unreasonable warrantless searches, searches that exceed the scope of
a warrant, and personal searches prior to a
legal arrest. Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43f*
127 N.Y.S.2d 116,-124 (1954),. ~ •
rThe U. S. Supreme Court in Schmcrber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16
L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), found blood testing p r o
cedures to 'plainly constitute searches of
persons' within the meaning of the fourth
amendment, stating:
Compulsory administration of a
blood test ... plainly involves the
broadly conceived reach of a search
and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment. ... Such,testing procedures plainly constitute searches of
'persons' and depend antecedently
upon seizures of 'persons', within
the meaning of that Amendment ....
(T]hc Fourth Amendment's proper
function is to constrain, not against
all intrusions as such, but against
intrusions which are not justified in
the circumstances, or which are
made in an improper manner. In
other words, the questions we must
decide in this case are whether the
police were justified in requiring
petitioner to submit to the blood
test, and whether the means and
procedures employed in taking his
blood respected relevant Fourth
Amendment standards of reasonableness.
Id. at 767; 86 S.Ct. at 1834; 16 L.Ed.2d at
914.
In Schmcrber, the arresting officer was
justified in requiring defendant's submission
to the blood test.because he "plainly (had]
probable cause" to arrest him and charge him
with driving under the influence of alcohol. In
determining whether the means and procedures
the officer employed in taking his blood respected relevant fourth amendment standards,
the Supreme Court considered whether the
arresting officer was required to obtain a
search warrant because "search warrants are
ordinarily required for searches of dwellings,
and absent an emergency, no less could be
required where intrusions into the human body
are concerned." id. at 770. The Court concluded that "the attempt to secure evidence of
blood-alcohol content in this case was an
appropriate incident to the petitioner's arrest"
because the arresting officer could reasonably
believe that he was confronted with an emergency in which the delay necessary to obtain a
warrant could result in the destruction of the
evidence because of natural dissipation of
alcohol in a person's blood stream. Id. at 77071. Further, such a blood test was a reasonable type of test because blood tests are commonplace, the quantity of blood extracted was
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minimal, there was virtually no risk, trauma,
or pain involved, and it was performed in a
reasonable manner by a physician in a hospital
environment. Therefore, requiring submission
to a blood test following a lawful arrest is not
a violation of the fourth and fourteenth
amendment right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.
In the present case, we must, as in Schmerbcr, decide: (1) whether the police were justified in requiring appellant to submit to the
blood test, and (2) whether the means and
procedures employed in taking his blood respected relevant constitutional standards of
reasonableness.
Considering the second issue first, the
means and procedures employed in taking
appellant's blood were substantially similar to
those employed in Schmcrbcr. The test involved the same degree of exigency as in Schmcrbcr, was a routine taking of blood, and was
performed by a medical technician in a hospital setting under accepted medical practices.
Therefore, the means and procedures involved
in taking the blood were constitutional.
However, the major issue in the present case is
whether the peace officers were justified in
requiring appellant to give blood to be tested.
There was clearly probable cause to place
appellant under arrest for a violation of Utah
Code Ann. §41-6-44(a) (1977),'because of
the investigating officer's observations of
appellant's slurred speech, erratic behavior,
odor of alcohol, and because appellant was
the only person in his vehicle. However, appellant was not placed under arrest prior to the
taking of the blood sample. Furthermore, even
though the officer stated that appellant was
coherent enough to understand him at the time
of taking the blood, he did not even advise
appellant of his rights, inform him of the
nature of the blood test,, nor warn him of the
consequences of refusal to submit to the blood
test. Obviously, no arrest occurred, and the
taking of the blood sample was not justified as
a search incident to arrest. After appellant was
released from the hospital, he returned home
and was served four days later with a
summons and citation.
An officer's demand that a non-arrested
motorist submit to a chemical test may lead to
arbitrary and unreasonable action by police
officers,2 and to a potentially unconstitutional
search and seizure. However, the constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures may be waived if the
defendant gives actual consent to the search in
question.i
The next inquiry is whether appellant, in
fact, consented to the blood test, either
through statutorily implied consent or actual
consent. The relevant portions of Utah's
implied consent law states:
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(a) Any person operating a motor
vehicle in this state shall be deemed
to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath,
blood or urine for the purpose of
determining whether he was driving
or in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or
combination of alcohol and any
drug, provided that such test is or
tests are administered at the direction of a peace officer having
grounds to believe such person to
have been driving o^. in actual
physical control of a n&tor vehicle
while under the influence of
alcohol, any drug, or combination
of alcohol and any drug ....
(b) If such person has been
placed under arrest and has thereafter been requested by a peace
officer to submit to any one or
more of the chemical tests provided
for in subsection (a) of this section
and refuses to submit to such chemical test or tests* such person shall
be warned by a peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal
to submit to the test or tests can
result in revocation of his license to
operate a motor vehicle
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.10(a) and (b)
(1981).
Although this statute appears to legislatively
create actual consent to a chemical test on
behalf of any person operating a motor
vehicle, it does not. It seems enigmatic to
interpret the statute to mean that if a driver
has impliedly consented to a blood test under
subsection (a), he may nevertheless refuse
under subsection (b) and withdraw his supposed consent. In fact, 'consent* describes a
legal act, and 'refusal* a physical reality. By
implying consent, the statute removes the right
of a driver to lawfully refuse, but cannot
remove his physical power to refuse. The
Oregon Supreme Court, concerning drivers
arrested for driving under the influence, has
observed:
[Rjefusal as contemplated by the
statute is something other than
withholding of consent because
consent is legally implied. It is a
refusal to comply with the consent
which has already been given as a
condition of a license to drive. The
purpose of a warning of license
suspension following a refusal is to
overcome an unsanctioned refusal
by threat instead of force. It is not
to reinstate a right to choice, let
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alone a voluntary and informed
choice, but rather to non-forcibly
enforce, the driver's previous
implied consent.
State v. Newton, 291 Or. 788, 636 P.2d 393J
398(1981).
Thus, the purpose of such a law is to avoidl
the violence which often attends attempts to
forcibly test recalcitrant drivers.4Through the
threat of potential license suspension and the
spectre of use of a refusal to submit to a|
blood test as evidence in any civil or criminal
action, police may persuade otherwise unwilling drivers to submit to the test. Nothing
suggests a legit'ative intent to create a consent
search, but only to create a means of nonphysical persuasion.
Furthermore, implied consent by statute
cannot supersede an otherwise constitutionally
protected right. For this reason, the Utah
Supreme Court in State v. Cruz, 21 Utah 2d
406, 446 P.2d 307 (1968), required actual
consent to a blood alcohol test when the driver
was not under arrest. Cruz stated that implied
consent is valid only in arrest situations, and
only after an opportunity is given to refuse to
comply with the implied consent law.
In February, 1977, the version of Utah
Code Ann. §41-6-44.10 (1975) which was
interpreted in Cruz, was amended by changing
the words "arresting officer" to "peace
officer'.mie State argues that this change
altered the results of Cruz to such an extent
that implied consent is now permissible in a
non-arrest situation, and, therefore, a
warrant is not necessary to draw blood for
testing. We are not persuaded by this argument. We conclude that the changes in the
statute do not alter the basic constitutional
protection of requiring a warrant for search
and seizure prior to an arrest, and construe
the statute to require this procedure.
In summary, implied consent justifies warrantless searches under the following circumstances:
(1) There is probable cause to
believe the suspect was driving or in
control of a motor vehicle while
having a statutorily prohibited
blood alcohol content,
(2) The suspect was arrested; and
(3) The method of extraction of
blood was reasonable.
The rationale behind permitting such a search
is that the blood alcohol evidence dissipates
over time, creating an exigent circumstance
which justifies a warrantless search. Because
appellant was not arrested, a warrantless
search was not justified and he did not come
under the implied consent statute. Therefore,
to sustain his conviction, pursuant to Cruz,
there must be a finding of actual consent. Cruz,
446 P.2d at 309.
The evidence indicates that appellant did not
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give actual consent to the blood test. There
was nothing in his demeanor or behavior
indicating actual consent. Qn the contrary, he
apparently offered some resistance to the
taking of blood. Further, no one informed
him that blood was being taken for purposes
of determining blood alcohol content. If the
officer had assumed appellant was under
arrest, he should have requested that he
submit to a blood test and have given him the
opportunity to comply or refuse. If appellant
had refused, the officer would then have been
obligated to explain the consequences of
refusal, which he did not do. Also, under the
circumstances, reasonable minds could conclude that blood was being withdrawn for
medical rather than law-enforcement purposes.
Because actual consent cannot be inferred
from the statute and appellant did not actually
consent to the procedure, the taking of the
blood sample did not come within the consent
exception to reasonable search and seizure
requirements. Therefore, we conclude that the
police failed to follow proper procedures and
were not justified in requiring appellant to
submit to the blood test. Consequently, the
blood test evidence must be excluded as the
product of an unconstitutional search and
seizure.
The purpose of the implied consent law is to
achieve the legitimate legislative purpose of
curtailing the terrible carnage on the highways
through quick removal from the highway of
those drivers who are a menace to themselves
and to others because they operate a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
and/or drugs. This purpose can be realized
without compromising fundamental constitutional rights. Present procedures, if followed,
are consistent with this concept.
U
' T h e second issue is whether there was suff-*
ideat^evkicocev^thout-^
test, to
sustain appellant's conviction.
The trial judge, the trier of fact in the
instant case, was discussing the blood test
issue with counsel during trial, focusing on the
test's significance and admissibility. In this
context, he made the following gratuitous
comment: "I think without the blood test you
lhave some problems. I think without the
blood there is at least some reasonable doubt
.* Because he was not evaluating all the
dence previously presented and because
uch a finding was not made in his ultimate
indings of fact, this comment, at this point in
he proceedings, does not rise to the level of a
inding of fact, and we will disregard it..Thus;;
dsitte'!t^!Mtoif%He^er"or not threviaencer
Its rwarsuffic*' to sustain appellant's conviction:
The Utah Supreme Court, in State v.
'atson, 684 P.2d 39. 41 (Utah 1984), stated
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that "(ijt is well settled that a reviewing court
has the power to review a case on the sufficiency of the evidence.4" The Court defined the
standard of review in criminal cases in State v.
Petrec, 659 P.2d 443, 444-45 (Utah 1983):
(W]e review the evidence and all
inferences which may be reasonably
drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict of the jury.
We reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable (hat reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted ...
(citations omitted). This Court still
has the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
verdict. The fabric of evidence
against the defendant must cover
the gap between the presumption of
innocence and the proof of guilt. In
fulfillment of its duty to review the
evidence and all inferences which
may reasonably be drawn from it in
the light most favorable to the
verdict, the reviewing court will
stretch the evidentiary fabric as far
as it will go. But this does not mean
that the court can take a speculative*
leap across a remaining gap m order _
to sustain a verdict* The evidence,*
stretched to its utmost limits, must"
be sufficient to prove the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Pursuant to this standard, we review the
sufficiency of the evidence from the record. In
this case, the record shows the following facts:
Appellant was involved in a serious head-on
collision. He had been driving erratically in
the wrong lane of traffic on a blind curve. The
other driver stated that she saw only one
person in appellant's truck just prior to the
collision, and appellant was the only person
found in the truck. Though upset, the appellant was not seriously injured and repeatedly
made unsolicited, voluntary statements while
not in custody, such as, "I am drunk. I am
juilty. They should take me out and shoot
me.* At times he talked incoherently in a
rambling manner, and "screamed and hollered/ There was a strong alcoholic odor both
it the scene of the accident and later at the
hospital. Because no alcohol containers were
found in the truck, the odor was coming from
pie*; appellant's person. In the non-custodial
Hfuation at the hospital, when his step-father
liked him whether he had taken drugs, he
lUted, 'No, just whiskey.* The highway patrolman who testified and was at the hospital,
Was an eighteen year veteran, had investigated
hundreds of drunk driving episodes, and had
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concluded the appellant was under the influence of intoxicants.
The defense presented no evidence.
We find from reviewing the evidence that
reasonable minds,could not. entertain a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the
crime Tor which he was convicted and that the
evidentiary fabric need.not even be stretched
to come to this conclusion. We therefore find,
even excluding the blood test, that there is
sufficient evidence to sustain appellant's
conviction in the juvenile court and that the
blood test evidence was only cumulative.
Appellant's conviction is affirmed.
R. W. Garff, Judge
I CONCUR:
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
1. The statute, in relevant part, states: "(i)t is unlawful and punishable as provided in subsection (d) of
this section for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, or who is under the influence of
any drug or combined influence of alcohol or any
drug to a degree which renders the person incapable
of safely driving a vehicle, to drive or be in actual
physical control of any vehicle within this state....'
2. The New York Court stated, in construing a
similar statute, that "(ujnder the statute as written,
any 'police officer,* whether he be a state trooper,
city patrolman, deputy sheriff or town constable,
may approach a motor vehicle operator, and claiming to have reasonable grounds to suspect him of
then operating a vehicle in an intoxicated condition,
demand that he give blood for a chemical test or
that he submit to one of the other chemical tests
provided for by the statute. This may, in fact, be
done upon the street without the making of an
arrest and without the presence of witnesses. In fact,
the officer may say to a motorist, 'Pull over to the
curb. It looks to me as if you are drunk. I want you
to come with me for the taking of a test of your
blood.' If the driver refuses, or if the officer
assumes a refusal on the driver's pan, his license
may be revoked without a hearing upon a mere ex
pane communication by the officer to the commissioner.- Schutt v. MMcDuff. 205 Misc. 43, 127
N.Y.S.2d 116.126(1954).
3. 'Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred,
but should be shown by clear and convincing evidence, and any consent must be voluntary and uncoerced, other physically or psychologically.- 68
Am.Jur.2dSea/c/iesuidSeizures, §46(1973).
4. in the instant case the peace officer testified that
*[w)e tried to calm him down so he [the medical
technician) could hold him [appellant 1 still enough
to be able to draw the blood, and he drew the blood
.... He (appellant) was shaking. Occasionally, he's
[sic) twitch and squirm around, as though he were
in shock or his eyes would sort of flutter as he laid
back. He could hear us and he was aware of what
was around him. but we just wanted to make sure
that we could (get) him to hold still long enough to
not - to not cause any injury as he drew the
blood.*
5. The statute was amended as follows:
(a) Any person operating a motor
vehicle in this state shall be deemed to
have given his consent to a chemical test

——..it rode«Co's Annotation Servkt
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or tests of his breath, (ef | blood, or urine
for the purpose of determining (the ale
oh oik? concern of hw blood] whether he
was driving or in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug, provided
that such test is or tests are administered
at the direction of a peace officer having
[ reasonable) grounds to believe such
person to have been driving (in on into
wieated condition) or in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol, any drug, or
combination of alcohol and any drug.
P>e arresting] A peace officer shall determine (within fCQson] which of the aforesaid tests shall be administered.
No person, who has been requested
pursuant to this section to submit to a
chemical test or tests of his breath,
blood, or urine, shall have the right to
select the test or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of a peace
officer to arrange for any specific, test
shall not be a defense to taking a test
requested by a peace officer nor be a
defense in any criminal, civil or admin*
tstrativc proceeding resulting from a
person's refusal to submit to the requested test or tests.
((b) Any person operating a motor
vehicle in this state shall be determined
to have given his consent to a chemical
test or tests of his Wood or urine for the
purpose of determining whether he was
driving or was in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of any norcotte drug or other drug
if arrested for any offense where, at the
time of orresi, the arresting officer haj
reasonable—grounds to believe such
person to have been driving or in actual
physical control of o motor vehicle while
under the influence of o narcotic drug or
other drug.]
((e)| \b) If such person has been placed
under arrest and has thereafter been
requested by a peace officer to submit to
anv on€
Qf raorc of the chemical tests
provided for in [subsections] subsection
(a) ler-tb)] of this section and refuses to
submit to such chemical test or tests,
such person shall be warned by a peace
officer requesting the test or tests that a
refusal to submit to the test or tests can
result in revocation of his license to
operate a motor vehicle. Following this
warning, unless such person immediately
requests the chemical test or tests as
offered by a peace officer be administered, (the) no test shall (not] be given and
(the arresting] a peace officer shall (adv»e
the person—of—his—nghts—under this
*1 submit a sworn report that he
had grounds to believe the arrested
person had been driving or was in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol or any
drug or combination of alcohol and any
drug and that the person had refused to
submit to a chemical test or tests as set

Code«Co
Prv«e. Uuth

forth in subsection (a) of this section.

BENCH, Judge: (Concurring and Dissenting)
I concur with the conclusion that the blood
est was erroneously admitted into evidence
ut I reserve judgment on the constitutional
asis for the conclusion.
The blood test would be admissible if app- r
nsent is clearly absent. The narrow question
fore us is whether the test was admissible
nder Utah's implied consent statute. Utah
(tode Ann. §41-6-44.10(1986).
The arrest of a motorist is the triggering
mechanism of our implied consent statute. State
vl Cruz, 21 Utah 2d 406, 446 P.2d 307
(1968). Other jurisdictions have also so ruled.
See Lcrblance, Implied Consent To Intoxication Tests: A Flawed Concept, 53 St. John's
L. Rev. 39. 42 n.9 (1978). The State contends
the legislature attempted to delete the requirement of arrest by changing "arresting officer*
to 'peace officer.* Yet, the statute still contemplates that motorists do not become subjea
to the implied consent law until after a formal
airest. Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.10(2)
(1986) imposes sanctions where the motorist
"has been placed under arrest and has thereafter been requested by a peace officer to
submit to any one or more of the chemical
teits provided . . . . ' T h e only exceptions to the
arrest requirement-are where the motorist is
, unconscious, or in any other condition,
rendering^him incapable of refusing to submit
to{ ariy^such chemical lest ..I0 Utah Code
n. §41-6-44.10(3) (1986).
t the time the test was administered in the
instant case, appellant was neither under arrest
nor in a condition rendering him incapable of
refusing the test. The test was therefore erroneously admitted under the implied consent
statute. Because the issue may be decided on
grounds of statutory construction, discussion
of constitutional considerations is inappropriate^ State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982),
ana cases cited therein.
While I concur in the conclusion concerning
the blood test, I believe the case should be
remanded for a new trial. I therefore dissent
from the result reached in the majority
opinion.
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44(1) (1986)
provides for alternative means of proving a
person guilty of driving while intoxicated. The
prosecution may prove, by chemical test, the
person had a blood-alcohol content of . 0 8 ^
or greater. Alternatively, the prosecution may
prove, by independent evidence, the person
was under the influence of alcohol or any drug
"to a degree which renders the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle." See Kehl v.
Schiendiman, 735 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah App.
1987).

Vor complete Utiih Code Annotations, consult Code • C o ' i Annotation Service
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As intimated by the majority, the trial judge
in the instant case made no finding as to the
sufficiency of independent evidence. At the
conclusion of the State's case, appellant
moved to suppress all evidence related to the
blood test. The court took the matter under
advisement and requested both parties to
prepare and submit briefs on the motion. The
State then suggested rather than wait for the
court's ruling on the motion, appellant should
proceed to present his case. In response,
appellant explained that only if the court
denied his motion would he then call expert
witnesses to refute the State's claim of sufficient independent evidence.. The court thereupon continued the balance of the trial to
January 30, 1986. In a minute entry dated
December 19, 1985, the date of trial, the court
recorded:
Prosecution evidence was presented.
Attorneys will submit briefs by
January 24, 1986 for Judge to determine admissability [sic] of certain
evidence presented. Court's determination of admissability (sic] will
determine whether or not defense
evidence needs to be presented.
Further hearing and/or disposition
scheduled for January 30,1986.
In a decision dated January 23, 1986, the
court denied appellant's motion to exclude
and admitted the blood test result into evidence. When trial reconvened on January 30,
appellant, in light of the court's ruling,
offered no evidence. The court then found the
allegations in the petition to be true and
entered judgment against appellant.
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The judgment in the instant case was based
solely on the blood test. As the trial court
failed to make a finding of sufficient independent evidence of intoxication, I would
remand the case for a new trial.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
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MEMORANDUM DECISION
PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the
Small
Claims Department of the Fifth Judicial
The trial court clearly reserved any finding
whether sufficient evidence existed, indepen- Circuit Court seeking recovery for replacement
dent of the blood test, to find appellant in of a damaged sewer lateral. Although plaintiff
violation of section 41-6-44(1). In its find- allegedly incurred damages in the amount of
ings and decree, the court determined appel- $2,092.30, he elected to proceed in Small
lant was under the influence of alcohol based Claims Court where his recovery would be
limited to $1,000.00. Plaintiff originally filed
solely on a blood alcohol levd of .18%.
affidavits
with the court alleging liability of
The majority opinion, in light of the trial
court's failure to do so, proceeds to make its Hobbs & Sons, Ken] Building (later changed
own finding of sufficient independent evidence to Arnold Development Co.), Taylorsvilleto affirm the judgment. However, it is not the Bennion Improvement District, and Frank
function of this Court to make findings of Armstrong. At the time of the hearing, plaifact. Rucker v. Da/ton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah ntiff had effected service on all defendants
1979). Nor is it the function of "an appellate except Arnold Development Company.
The case was heard on December 23, 1986
court to decide disputed questions of fact in
before
Judge Pro Tern David Berceau. The
the first instance and then choose between
hearing
involved testimony of a number of
affirmance and reversal by testing its factual
conclusion against that which the trial court witnesses, including plaintiff Dana Meier and
might have or ... must have reached for it to his wife, defendant Frank Armstrong, two
issue the judgment it did." Nicpoa v. Nicpon, representatives of defendant Taylorsville9 Mich. App. 373. 157 N.W.2d 464, 467 Bennion Improvement District, two represen(1968). (Emphasis in original.) Jttthorriiie tatives of defendant Hobbs <fe Sons, and a
function .of this Court is to rcvie*rabc*Tecord/ witness called by plaintiff. At, the time of the
to^dctermine^ whe^er.. substantial. evidence hearing, the judge dismissed plaintiffs claims
existi'Td^nipport'the trial court's findings! against Taylorsville-Bennion Improvement
Rdm&wssd vrRussch\ 649 P.2d 26 (Utah District and Frank Armstrong. The case proceeded against Hobbs & Sons, a subcontractor that was involved in installation of
consult Code • Co's Annotation Service
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Leger testified that Seldal had in his
possession a pistol, which, in spite of repeated attempts by Seldal, would not fire
because it did not have a clip. Prior to
Seldal's death, Seldal had the pistol in his
belt. A victim of a local burglary testified
that his home was burglarized on August
17, 1972, and in addition to the shotgun in
evidence (against Rogers) a 7.65 mm German pistol was taken; however, the clip
to the weapon was missed by the burglars.
Upon examination of Seldal's clothing
after his death, five 7.65 cartridges were
found by the authorities. When Rogers
took the Browning shotgun to the pawnshop, he also had in his possession an automatic handgun. An employee, Larry Johnston, testified that he cocked the gun and
attempted to pull the trigger and that he
could not make the firing mechanism work.
Rogers explained that the gun would not
work without a clip, and it didn't have one.
Rogers then proceeded to order a clip for
it.
At a later time, Rogers told Johnston
that a business deal they had was off because there was some "heat" on him. At
the time Rogers was apprehended by the
police, in Washington, he informed them
that Leger was not as deeply involved, in
the incident, as Christean was, and that
Christean and Seldal had had a dispute
over a large quantity of drugs and money.
Leger had testified that Seldal and Christean had approximately $800 that they had
acquired from Trolley Square, and that
Rogers had requested Seldal divide his
share. Seldal refused, and Rogers responded that he'd "get him one of these
days."
[7-9] In State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d
162, 167-168, 389 P.2d 465 (1964), this
court stated that it may well be that certain facets of the evidence, considered separately, could be regarded as not inculpatory and thus be vulnerable to the accused's
claim that it does not connect him with the
crime. However, the law does not require
that the separate bits of evidence be
viewed in isolation, for it is proper to take

whatever fragments of proof that can be
found and piece them together with the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in order to fill in the whole mosaic
of the crime. Although a conviction may
not rest solely upon the Itestimony of an
accomplice, all of the circumstances may
be viewed together to determine the facts.
The corroborative evidence should be considered in relation to the other facts appearing in the evidence of record. If, in
utilizing this process, it can be accepted by
reasonable minds, as evidence of substance
and probative value tending to connect the
defendant with the crime,| the requirements
of the law are fulfilled.
[10] In the instant case when the entire record of the trial which extended
over a period of nineteen^ days, is considercd, there emerges suff i|cient evidence to
sustain the convictions oii appeal, and this
we do.
HENRIOD, C. J., and CROCKETT, EL
LETT, and TUCKETT, J J., concur.

i«Sy

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Richard Arthur CHAMBERS, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 13845

Supreme Court (if Utah.
March 24, 197;J.

The State appealed f j-om orders of the
First District Court, Bo!x Elder County,
VeXoy Christoffersen, J expunging accused's criminal record and denying motion
for stay of the expungernent order. The
Supreme Court, Maugha|n, J., held that
provisions of statute pertaining to cxpungement of criminal re):pord upon motion
of any person were not applicable to ex-

STATE v. CHAMBERS

Utah

877

Citeas533P.2dS7«

pungemcnt order entered on court's own
motion, and that expungement of criminal
record of accused who had been convicted
of making profit of public money and of
misusing public funds was within trial
court's discretion even though expungement order was entered less than five
years after the convictions, despite contention that expungement was not compatible
with the public interest.
Affirmed except as to those parts of
order not in consonance with opinion and,
as to them, matter remanded with instructions.
Henriod, C. J., and Crockett, J., dissented and filed opinions.

1. Criminal Law C=>982.8, 1222

In proceeding under statute pertaining
to power of court to dismiss or discharge
defendant, previously placed on probation,
trial court cannot seal criminal record, restrict its inspection or bring into operation
circumstances which would allow response
to inquiries relating to a conviction of
crime as though such conviction had never
occurred; however, trial court can terminate sentence and set aside plea of guilty
and conviction and can dismiss action, discharge defendant and direct that copies of
order be dispatched to appropriate agencies. U.GA.I953, 77-35-17.
See publication Words and Phrases
for or her judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Criminal Law €=>982.l, 1222
Probation and expungement of one's
criminal record are neither matters of
right nor of grace but can only be granted
when they appear to be compatible with
the public interest. U.CA.1953, 77-35-17,
77-35-17.5.
3. Criminal Law C=>982.8
In exercise of trial court's broad discretionary powers to dismiss or discharge
defendant, trial court must consider intangibles such as character and personality
traits of defendant, his attitude, his prior
record, his performance under probation,
and whether he has acquitted himself well

in accepting duties that society requires.
U.CA.1953,1 77-35-17.
4. Criminal Law €=»II47

Judgment of trial court expunging a
defendant's criminal record should not be
disturbed if trial court's discretion has
been reasonably used and has not been
shown to have been abused or exercized in
an arbitrary or capricious fashion. U.C.A.
1953, 77-35-17, 77-35-17.5.
5. Criminal Law <G=>!222

Proceeding under statute pertaining to
discharge of a defendant on court's own
motion and expunging criminal record of
accused who had been convicted of making
a profit of public money and of misusing
public funds were within trial court's discretion even though expungement order
was entered less than five years after convictions, despite contention that expungement order was not compatible with the
public interest. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-17, 7735-17,5.

Vernon B. Roinney, Atty. Gen., M. Reid
Russell, Earl F. Dorius, Asst. Attys. Gen.,
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Walter G. Mann, of Mann & Hadfield,
Brigham City, for defendant and respondent.
MAUGHAN, Justice:
This matter comes to us as an appeal
from an order of the trial court expunging
defendant's criminal record, and denying
the State's motion for a stay of that order.
The trial court proceeded under the provisions of Section 77-35-17, U.C.A.1953, as
amended.
Defendant entered a plea of guilty to
two charges of felony, viz., making a profit of public money and of misusing public
funds. Upon motion of the prosecuting attorney eight other charges were dismissed.
The court then sentenced defendant to two
indeterminate terms in the state penitentiary, the sentences to run concurrently. The
execution of the sentences was suspended,
and defendant was placed on probation,
one of the terms of which was that he
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serve one year in the county jail. After
serving four months, the sentencing judge
modified the terms of the probation by terminating defendant's sentence, and on the
twenty-first day of August 1972 placed defendant on probation, under the supervision of the Department of Adult Probation
and Parole. Thereafter, on October 9,
1973, pursuant to an affidavit of an official of the Adult Probation and Parole Department stating that defendant had successfully completed his probation, defendant was discharged therefrom.
On July 8, 1974, the trial court expunged
defendant's record. The prosecutor opposed the expungement, and later moved
the court to stay its order for five years so
as to comply with the provisions of Section
77-35-17.5, U.CA.1953, as amended L.1973,
Chapter 198, Section 1; this motion was
denied.
The State raises three points on appeal;
the first two may be combined, they are:
(1) that the provisions of 77-35-17.5 were
applicable and should have been applied;
(2) that the expungement order was not
compatible with the public interest. Defendant countered by claiming that the
provisions of 77-35-17 were applicable, and
by challenging the State's right to appeal.
These two statutes are mutually exclusive. Section 77-35-17.5 does not purport
to amend or repeal 77-35-17. It is apparent that each deals with a different
situation.
Section 77-35-17 (L.1923, Chapter 74, as
amended by L.1943, Chapter 24) could be
called the Court's Statute, for it comes into
operation on the court's own motion or
that of the prosecutor.
The court could
move on its own motion to expunge, and
did so pursuant to 77-35-17, as set forth in
its order.
Section 77-35-17.5 could be
called the Any Person Statute, for it comes
into operation on the motion of any person
who can find definition within its terms.
1. Andrews v. Police* Court of City of Stockton, Cal.App., 123 IMM 12S, VJ9.
2. State v. Zolautakis, 70 Utah 296, 250 P.
1044 (1027).

[1] The record shows a confusion of
both statutes in the initiation of this matter; this is carried nto the court's order,
and is not properly a part of the authority
granted under 77-35^17. Proceeding under
this statute the court cannot seal the record, restrict its inspection, nor bring into
operation circumstances which would allow
a response to inquiries relating to a conviction of crime, as th|pugh such conviction
had never occurred, The court can terminate the sentence, set aside a defendant's
plea of guilty, the conviction, dismiss the
action, and discharge] the defendant. The
court can also direct that copies of its order be dispatched to appropriate agencies
—this the court can do in aid of its order,
that it may have its intended effect.
The word "expunge" properly describes
a physical act, not a legal one. 1 However,
in relation to 77-35-1/, it has become fastened in our law by decision and practice
as descriptive of what the court can do under that statute. In this sense it is expressive of cancel, revoke, set aside.
[2] Some argument, in the briefs, is
made concerning whether the subject action of the court comes to a defendant as a
matter of right or of grace. Probation
and expungement of one's record are neither matters of right nor of grace, but can
only be granted when they appear to be
compatible with the public interest. 2 The
Zolantakis case referred only to suspension
of sentence and probation, as then provided
under Chapter 74, L. 923. In 1943, the
legislature added the List sentence to what
is now our 77-35-17, providing for an expungement of one's record "if it be compatible with the public interest."
This
court, subsequently addressed itself to that
ultimate sentence, and said it was "for the
purpose of permitting |he court under unusual circumstances and for good cause to
expunge the record of crime." 3
3.

State v. Schrcilwr, \2\
222 (1!>;7J).

Ctali «53. 245 I\2d
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[3,4] In the exercise of these broad
discretionary powers, which are clearly
allowed to encourage reformation of
wrongdoers, 4 the court must consider a
great many intangibles, such a s : the character and personality traits of the defendant, his attitude, his prior record, his performance under probation, and whether he
has acquitted himself well in accepting the
duties his society requires. If this discretion is reasonably used, and is not shown
to have been abused, arbitrary, or capricious, the judgment of the trial court
should not be disturbed. 5 There is no
showing here that the trial court did not
properly consider the necessary conditions
precedent to expungement prior to its order.
[5] The State claims, in its third point,
that the action of the trial court was not
compatible with the public interest, and in
support thereof says that such interest is
not served in cleansing, so rapidly, the record of the criminal acts here involved.
We are certainly not unmindful of the seriousness of crimes, which have as their
gravamen the failure to honor a public
trust. However, we cannot support the
State's claim, in this instance, as a general
proposition, because of the discretionary
function of the trial court, and because the
trial court's performance has not been
shown to have exceeded its discretionary
boundaries. The trial court proceeded pursuant to statute, and from the record
presented, we conclude, could have reasonably found the expungement to be in the
public interest. No evidence has been adduced to show the interest of the State to
have been ill served.

E L L E T T and T U C K E T T , JJ., concur.
H E N R I O D , Chief Justice (dissenting):
I concur in the dissent with Mr. Justice
Crockett except as to that part of his opinion suggesting that to seal or expunge
criminal records is an unpardonable sin,
and interment of the truth and a distortion
of justice. I agree generally that expungement and scaling of public records should
fly on the wings of a rare bird,—but T
think it wholesome and responsive to the
public weal, if, in a given case, it would
award a young man, for example, the opportunity to enlist in the military, possibly
to die for his country, and doing so, might
suffer physical, as well as bookkeeping, expungement, but who somehow might exult
in some kind of spiritual compensation.
This in the light of perhaps a Christian interment of a penitent criminal and a forgivable, non-capital, record that in perpetuity, admittedly would prevent such a pardon (which traditionally is American and
human), rather than to pursue a course
that may burn away his everything on a
pyre of papyrus in a musty County Court
House.

The trial court is affirmed, except as to
those parts of its order not in consonance
with this opinion, and as to them, the matter is remanded with instructions to render
an order reflecting the directions herein.
Xo costs awarded.

We extend such authority to the Probate
Court, where the history of an adopted
child is sealed in silence, 1 where the heartbreak of revealing it in some instances
would be the difference between unmerciful death and merciful life. The pardoning power is an adjunct of what this author is trying to say. Many a convict is
entitled to some kind of chance, and if a
reasonable, properly administered bit of
nondisclosure would help to get him a job
without forsaking entirely his heritage and
country, and without constant police surveillance, rather than promoting recidivism,—I see no sense other than to apply
the Biblical admonition to go hence and sin
no more,—and if he follows it, let's forget

4.

I. Title 78-30-15. I'tali Code Annotated, 1953.

Williams v. Harris, 1<M> Utah 387, 149 P.
LM <>40 (1944).

5. Williams v. Harris, lbi<l.; State v. Sibert,
<i Trail LM I!>s. 310 I\2«i 388 (1957).
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it. I think the statute points up such a
philosophy,—but even yet could be more
viable.
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting):
I dissent, based on two propositions.
First, the so-called "Order of Expungement" is, in my opinion, squarely and incontestably contrary to Section 77-35-17,
U.C.A.1953, upon which it expressly states
it is based.
Second, and more important, the order
ignores and violates the explicit mandate
of Section 77-35-17.5, U.C.A.1953, which
contains the only authorization for anything resembling the "expungement" which
is ordered; and which statute provides
that there must be five years of proper
conduct before any such order may be entered.
The material portion of the court's memorandum decision, dated August 6, 1974,
states:
The court previously issued its order
of expungement. The plaintiff State of
Utah has now filed a motion for an order to stay execution of the expungement for a period of five years as provided in Section 77-35-17.5.
As previously stated in the court's order, the basis for expungement was not
on the basis of Section 77-35-17.5 but
[A] was on the basis of the previous
section not repealed, Section 77-35-17,
[B] for the reason that the conviction in
this case occurred prior to the enactment
of 77-35-17,5, and the court feels that,
therefore, Section 17-35-17 is the applicable statute and the five years would
then not be in effect.
As to how the action was initiated into
the court, upon whose motion, the court
took notice of such motion and [C] on
its own behalf made the order of expungement. The court feels, therefore,
that this is not an issue and denies the
motion for a stay of expungement for
the five year period under 77-35-17.5.

It is not without some discomfiture that I
feel compelled to point out that the emphasized portions of the lower court's memorandum decision as set forth above are patently in error. But in those emphasized
parts, at which I have inserted [ A ] , [ B ] ,
and [C] for identification in the discussion
below, there are misstatements of both law
and fact.
The error at [A[] is the statement that
the expungement oifder is based on Section
77-35-17, whereas, that statute has no
word, nor even a h|int, about expungement
or sealing records. It necessarily follows
that the order recites any possible foundation it might have out from under itself.
The error at [Bj is with the recital that
the conviction occurred prior to the enactment of Section 77+35-17.5 * to make it appear that the five-ypear waiting period does
not apply. That section provides for a
post-conviction procedure.
It obviously
can be invoked at any time after the con-,
viction so long as its requirements are met.
The trial court's statement that the statute
does not apply because it was enacted after
the conviction cannot be other than an attempt to avoid the mandate of that section :
that there must be a five-year period of
right conduct before any such order can be
entered.
The error at AC] is that the court's
statement that it jtook notice of such motion and on its own behalf made the order
of expungement" seems to be an attempt to
change the complexion of the proceeding
in a manner squarely inconsistent with the
court's recital in its order of July 8, 1974,
issued just one month previously:
That the said Richard Arthur Chambers has now petitioned the court to allow him to withdraw his plea of guilty
to said charges and dismiss the information in all of said complaints being Criminal Complaints numbered 1370 to 1379,
pursuant to th^ provisions of Section
77-35-17 Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
and to expunge the record.

I. Took effect May 8, 1973; see Ch. 198, S.L.U. 1973.
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One wonders why, in addition to the other errors pointed out above, the trial court
felt it necessary to attempt to make it appear that it was the court, and not Mr.
Chambers, who initiated this so-called "expungement" proceeding.
I suppose nearly everyone has experienced the ego comfort that comes from
helping someone in trouble; and the pang
that comes from the necessity of adversely
affecting his fellowman. I also acknowledge that for anyone who has erred, it is
commendable and desirable to extend sympathy, encouragement and rehabilitation in
any wholesome and proper way.
Xotwithstanding what I have just said, I
think there are some fundamental and important considerations which impel the necessity of pointing out the unlawfulness of
the procedure taken in this case. I observe
that this is prompted by no concern about
Mayor Chambers as an individual (of
whom I know nothing except as revealed
in this record). It may seem to some that
such a procedure is quite all right for some
eminent person who has erred. But our
purpose should transcend concern about
any individual. It should be about the pattern such a proceeding (and its approval
by this court), sets for the multitude of ordinary citizens, and the effect it will have
upon them; and upon all criminal procedures and criminal records generally.
The administration of justice entails the
duty of being faithful and truthful in recording and preserving what is done in
fulfilling that responsibility. The records
and history are made up, not only of heroics and accomplishments, but of failures
and follies, and out of the total experience
come the lessons, hopefully, for minimizing
wrongful and encouraging rightful conduct. It is my opinion that that desired
2. Insof.-ir ,is this writer is <«oucerned, neither
asking nor expecting anyone else to agree,
I seriously question the wimtom of the application of such a statute except in rare
and exigent circumstances; and particularly
that portion thereof which purports to authorize a convicted and "expunged" person to
lie, ifi denying that he has ever been con533 P 2d—56

objective cannot properly be served by official distortions to circumvent the law.
There is no authority cited, and none can be
found, to support the proposition that the
trial court has any inherent power to obliterate its records. If it has any power to
change the official records of conviction, it
certainly cannot exist except as expressly
authorized by statute. 2
It was undoubtedly for the foregoing
reasons that the legislature appears to have
been quite circumspect in the allowance of
this sealing or "expungement" of the record by including the precaution that it
should be done only after the expiration of
a period of five years of following the
path of rectitude by one convicted of
crime. This condition has not been complied with because »">p order appealed
from is patently c o ; e ^ ! y t 0 ^ a w a s e x *
plained above, it shoun,vA* ;^et aside. (All
emphasis added.)
Bm ^
irdK\
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Jane PAPPAS, dba J. P. & Company,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
GATEHOUSE CONSTRUCTION, INC., a
corporation, Defendant and
Respondent.
No. 13787.

Supreme Court of Utah.
March 31, 1975.

An interior decorator sued a construction company on the basis of an alleged
agreement. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., J.,
gave a judgment of no cause of action, and
viefed of crime. The mischief that may
ramify from such falsifying should be obvious. Nevertheless, I bow to the legislative
will as expressed in Section 77-35-17.5 that
under proper circumstances after the lapse
of jive year* the court may aet in accordance
therewith.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
John Wilson PETREE, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 18015.
Supreme Court of Utah
Feb. 4, 1983.
Defendant was convicted in the Fifth
District Court, Iron County, J. Harlan
Burns, J., of second-degree murder of a
15-year-old girl, and he appealed. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J., held that, although
the evidence was sufficient to conclude that
the death of the victim involved criminal
activity, the evidence was not sufficient to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant caused the victim's death and, even
if the evidence proved that the defendant
caused the death, it was manifestly insufficient to prove that he did so "intentionally
or knowingly" as was charged in the complaint.
Conviction reversed.
Hail, C.J., dissented in an opinion in
which Durham, J., joined.
1. Homicide c=>229
Identification of ring, jacket, sweater
and pin found with skeleton as those of
victim by victim's aunt and mother, along
with testimony that victim was 15 years of
age, five feet, four inches in height, had no
dental work but had earlier suffered fracture to left forearm that had healed, was
sufficient to permit jury to conclude that
skeletal remains were those of victim.
2. Homicide c=> 228(1)
In second-degree murder prosecution,
corpus delicti was established by evidence
that death occurred and concealment of
skeletal remains and unnatural position of
body provided sufficient evidence from
which jury could conclude that death resulted from criminal activity.

3. Criminal Law <s=>I 159.2(7)
Supreme Court reverses jury's conviction for insufficient e kidence only when evidence, taken in light most favorable to verdict, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained reasonable doubt that defendant committed crjime of which he was
convicted.
4. Criminal Law c=>li44.13(2)
In fulfillment of its duty to review
evidence and all inferences which may be
drawn from it in light most favorable to
verdict, reviewing court will stretch evidentiary fabric as far as it| will go, but this does
not mean that court tan take speculative
leap across remaining gap between presumption of innocence and proof of guilt in
order to sustain verdict.
5. Homicide <s=»230, 234(8)
Evidence that defendant was last person seen with victim before she disappeared, that defendant left town on day
after victim disappeared and that defendant had made statement referring entirely
or almost entirely to descriptions of a
strange dream was insufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt that, even if defendant caused victim's death, he did so
"intentionally or knowingly" as was
charged in complaint for second-degree
murder. U.C.A.1953, 7ft -5-203(1 Xa).
Scott Jay Thorley, Patrick H. Fenton,
Cedar City, for defendant and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Aity. Gen., Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff and respondent.
OAKS, Justice:
A jury convicted defendant of second degree murder of a fifteen-year-old girl who
was his high school classmate. He was
sentenced to five years to life, and entered
upon service of his sentence. On this appeal, he urges that the ev dence was insufficient to show that the crime was committed
or that he committed it. The prosecution's
evidence was essentially undisputed. The
parties disagree on the inferences to be
drawn from it. The facts are unique.
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On July 2, 1980, a man who was other- bel, Utah, 620 P.2d 515, 517 (1980); State v.
wise unrelated to the events of this case Cazier, Utah, 521 P.2d 554, 555 (1974). In
uncovered a human skeleton by a row of this case, the "injury" in the first part of
trees along a fence line in the large back- the definition is the death of a human beyard behind his rented home in Cedar City. ing. As for the second requirement, it is
The skeleton was about 30 inches below the unnecessary to show cause of death or to
surface of the ground in an old carrot pit provide evidence on the specific degree of
beneath a wooden trap door covered by a homicide. The State need only present evimound of earth. The police, who were noti- dence that the death resulted from criminal
fied immediately, concluded from the posi- conduct rather than by accident or from
tion of the skeleton that the body had been natural causes. "The criminal agency
placed in the pit on its chest with the hips causing death may be proved by circumbent forward and the legs and arms folded stantial evidence and the reasonable inferover the back of the body. Along with the ences to be drawn therefrom." People v.
skeleton; they discovered a ring, a jacket, a Miller, 71 Cal.2d 459, 78 Cal.Rptr. 449, 459,
sweater with a pin attached, blue jeans, 455 P.2d 377, 387 (1969). That was done in
female underclothing, and a pair of boxer this case. The concealment of the skeletal
shorts. The medical examiner concluded remains and the unnatural position of the
that the skeleton was that of a female body provided sufficient evidence from
between 14 and 17 years of age, approxi- which the jury could conclude that Phyllis
mately 5 feet 2 inches in height (plus or Ady died from criminal activity.
minus 2 inches). The left forearm had a
[3] This appeal turns on whether there
thickened area indicating a healed fracture. was sufficient evidence for the jury to conThe teeth contained no dental work. Nei- vict defendant of the crime of second dether the time nor the cause of death could gree murder for "intentionally or knowingbe determined from the skeletal remains. ly" causing the death of Phyllis Ady. In
[1] Phyllis Ady, age 15, was reported considering that question, we review the
missing at 1:00 a.m. on December 13, 1977, evidence and all inferences which may reajust over two and one-half years before the sonably be drawn from it in the light most
skeleton was discovered. At that time, she favorable to the verdict of the jury. We
was residing with her aunt and uncle, the reverse a jury conviction for insufficient
Westmans, who lived approximately one evidence only when the evidence, so viewed,
block from where the body was found. is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently imMrs. Westman and Betty Ady, the victim's probable that reasonable minds must have
mother, identified the ring, jacket, sweater, entertained a reasonable doubt that the deand pin found with the skeleton as Phyllis's. fendant committed the crime of which he
On the basis of that identification and their was convicted. State v. Kerekes, Utah, 622
testimony that Phyllis was 15 years of age, P.2d 1161, 1168 (1980); State v. Lamm,
5 feet 4 inches in height, had no dental Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980); State v.
work, but had earlier suffered a fracture of Gorlick, Utah, 605 P.2d 761, 762 (1979);
the left forearm that had healed, the jury State v. Daniels, Utah, 584 P.2d 880, 882-83
had ample evidence to conclude that the (1978); State v. Romero, Utah, 554 P.2d
skeletal remains were those of Phyllis Ady. 216, 219 (1976).
[2] The evidence summarized above also
met the requirement of corpus delicti,
which, we have said, "requires only that the
State present evidence [1] that the injury
specified in the crime occurred, and [2] that
such injury was caused by someone's criminal conduct." State v. Knoefler, Utah, 563
P.2d 175,176 (1977). Accord: State v. Kim-

[4] In view of what is said in the dissent
on this subject, we deem it desirable to
emphasize that notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's decision
this Court still has the right to review the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the
verdict. The fabric of evidence against the
defendant must cover the gap between the
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presumption of innocence and the proof of
guilt. In fulfillment of its duty to review
the evidence and all inferences which may
reasonably be drawn from it in the light
most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing
court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as
far as it will go. But this does not mean
that the court can take a speculative leap
across a remaining gap in order to sustain a
verdict. The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. State in re J.S.H., Utah, 642 P.2d
386 (1982); State v. Kourbelas, Utah, 621
P.2d 1238, 1240 (1980).
[5] Viewed in the light most favorable
to the jury's verdict, the evidence against
the defendant was as follows. At the time
Phyllis disappeared, she and defendant
were both 15 years of age. They lived
about a half block apart on 900 West in
Cedar City, she with the Westmans and he
with his mother. They attended the same
school, but they apparently did not have a
dating relationship. Phyllis's aunt testified
that before December 12, 1977, defendant
had been to their home on only one occasion, the day before, when he merely came
to the door to inquire if Phyllis was home.
As she was driven past defendant's house
at about 6:00 p.m. on December 12, Phyllis
asked to be let off. Mrs. Westman observed defendant, who had been sitting on
his porch, walk out to meet Phyllis in the
road. Mrs. Westman never saw Phyllis
again. When Phyllis had not come home at
about 9:00 or 9:30 that evening, Mrs. Westman went to defendant's home but found
no one there. Sometime between 10:30
p.m. and midnight, she returned and, when
defendant answered the door, asked about
Phyllis's whereabouts.1 He replied that he
did not know, that she had left him and
gone with a blonde long-haired fellow defendant did not know. At 1:00 a.m., Mrs.
Westman reported Phyllis missing.
On the evening of December 12, before
8:00, defendant telephoned his sister in Las
l. Neither defendant's mother nor the man who
boarded with them nor Mrs. Westman noted
anything unusual about defendant's appeur-

Vegas. He told her that "he was getting a
hassle at home and in school and he wanted
to come down." He phoned again the next
morning. His sister then drove to Cedar
City, picked him up about noon, and drove
him back to Las Vegis. Defendant then
stayed with his sister and her husband in
Las Vegas for about four days.
Aside from whatever inference might be
drawn from the fact that defendant was
the last jKjrson seen wiih Phyllis before she
disappeared and the fact that he left Cedar
City the day after she disappeared, the only
evidence of defendant's guilt of murder in
the second degree were statements
:
he made
to three family members during his visit in
Las Vegas and a statement he made to a
girl friend two years later. There was no
other evidence of admissions, no physical
evidence, and no motive for the homicide.
All of defendant's statements to familv
members concerned an| experience he had
during his four-day visi to Las Vegas. His
sister and her husband heard him screaming
in the night, before midnight. Concluding
that he was having a nightmare, they took
him into the kitchen to
various witnesses' accounts of what was
said are critical, and ape therefore quoted
here in their entirety.
Alisa Backstoce, defendant's sister, testified as follows:
Q. Mrs. Backstoce, pan you tell me in
substance and effect what was said and
by whom in this conversation around
your kitchen table?
A. We asked JohnrW what his nightmares was about. He said he was having
a nightmare about walking with a girl
and she slapped him and that's all he
remembered, and then waking up taking
a bath and her folks, the girl's folks
pounding on the doop wanting to know
where she was.
Q. All right. Did hfe say anything else
about the girl, othejr than just what
you've told us?
ance or demeanor when they saw him at various limes between 9:00 p.m. and midnight on
December 12.
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A. Later he said he thought he had hurt
Q. What did he tell you?
or killed a girl, but he wasn't sure.
A. Well, he proceeded to tell me that he
In context, and by its literal terms, this
was walking through a field with—I took
testimony clearly referred to the content of
it as a young girl. He didn't say what
Johnny's (defendant's) dream, although the
girl or who it was, but she slapped him.
last quoted answer might be subject to the
He blacked out. And then he goes on
interpretation that it referred to an actual
from there to say about the dreams.
occurrence.
Q. Okay, what did he tell you about the
The testimony of James Backstoce, which
dreams?
is quoted in the footnote,2 clearly refers
A. Okay. The dream, that was describsolely to the defendant's explanation of the
ed to me from him, and my sister both,
dream that had awakened him. In content,
that—
it is consistent with his wife's account.
Q. What did he tell you about the
Robert Petree, defendant's brother, testidream, not what your sister told you, but
fied that he went to the home in Las Vegas
what did he tell you?
during his brother's four-day visit to tell
A.
What he told me about the dream,
him that the Cedar City Police were looking
that
when he blacked out and he started
for him to question him about the disapto
dream
that he—his words were he
pearance of a young girl. Robert told his
thought he hurt her. He thought he
brother he was going to return him to Cemight have killed her.
dar City. The testimony continued as follows:
In context, it is clear that the statements
Q. All right. What happened, then, af- related in Robert's testimony were entirely
ter that; was there anything further concerned with defendant's dream and not
said?
with actual events.3 This was further emA. Yes. Alisa told me about these phasized in the cross-examination as folnightmares that she had been woken up. lows:
I don't remember how many times or
Q. Now if I understand you correctly,
what different nights. But she said that
you have been sitting here repeating
she had been awoken by his screaming in
what Mr. Petree told you about a dream
the night.
he had had, is that correct?
Q. All right. Did you have any further
A.
Yes, sir.
conversation about that with your brothThe only other evidence of defendant's
er?
A. Yes, sir. I asked him, you know, was guilt came in the testimony of Debra Wilthere something wrong or was something son, a girl who had dated defendant in Las
Vegas or California in the winter of 1980,
bothering him.
«

2.

A. We all sit down at the kitchen table and
discussed what had disturbed him to \*ake
him up like that
[Here followed several questions and mswers about the physical surroundings w( >re
the conversation took place and who was
present, as well as defense counsel's objection, denied, on admissibilitv The testimon\
then continued as follows ]
Q Mr Backstoce, again, what was said and
by whom at this conversation^
A The things we were discussing with
Johnny and, of course, the girl that was missing And during the discussion—
Q Okay, would you please tell us who said
what
A Well, John said that he was walking the
girl home and the girl slapped him and that

was the last thing he remembered till he
woke up taking a bath in the tub
Contrary to the interpretation in the dissent,
the first answer quoted here makes clear that
the entire testimony related to the content of
defendant's dream.
3. This is further authenticated by Robert Petree's unambiguous and repeated testimony to
the court during a hearing out of the presence
of the jury' on defendant's unsuccessful contention that the "admission" was inadmissible because the State had not proved the corpus
delicti In this hearing, Petree testified that all
of the statements he had repeated from the
defendant "came out of one of Johnnys
dreams "
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more than two years after Phyllis disappeared. She testified that during one of
their conversations defendant told her that
he had gotten into a fight with a girl in
Utah. He mentioned no names, dates, or
other details. His statement about this
event, as described in the witness's testimony, which is quoted in full in the footnote,4
was so inconsequential to this witness that
she said it "just passed through one ear and
out the other." In short, it could have
referred to any of a variety of real or
exaggerated events in the dating life of a
teenager. There was no other evidence of
guilt.
In resfwnse, the defense entered a stipulation that none of the "items" recovered
from the clothing in the pit or from a
nearby shed matched the hair samples taken from the defendant. A girl friend of
Phyllis's testified that when Phyllis left her
at about 6:00 on the evening of December
12 she said she was on her way to meet a
Ken Perkins, with whom the witness was
casually acquainted as a person who lived
nearby who wanted to date Phyllis.5 Other
defense witnesses testified that they
thought they had seen Phyllis alive at various places in the months following her disappearance. In the posture of this appeal,
we must assume that the jury placed no
credence in any of this testimony. On the
other hand, contrary to the suggestion in
the dissent, the fact that the jury did not
believe the defense implication that Perkins
was a viable sus{>ect adds little or no
strength to the case against the defendant.
Though the identification of another person
as a probable perpetrator may help a defendant in securing an acquittal, his failure
4.

Q Again, Miss Wilson, can you tell me in
substance and effect what was said and by
whom in this conversation
A He had told me that he had gotten in a
fight with a girl in Utah He didn't mention
any names
And he came home and he
couldn't remember nothing afterwards
Q Ail right, did he say anything else about
what condition he was in when he came
home 0
A Just that he remembered getting in a
tight and I guess he had Wood on his shirt,
thdt was what was mentioned, and he
couldn't lemember nothing

to identify another suspect provides no evidence of his guilt. A defendant must be
convicted on the strength of the evidence
against him, not on the weakness of the
evidence against someone else] Defendant's conviction must stand or fall on the
content of and inferences that can be drawn
from the prosecution's evidence.
The verdict of guilty of murder in the
second degree rests entirely on testimony of
defendant's meeting Phyllis on the street on
the evening she disappeared, his trip to Las
Vegas on the day following, and on three
witnesses' testimony of defendant's statements to them in Las Vegas. Interpreted
most favorably to the prosecution, those
statements refer entirely or almost entirely
to defendant's descriptions of his strange
dream. The testimony thai he told a date
two years later that he once nad a fight
with a girl in Utah adds nothing of substance on this issue.
While the evidence was sufficient for the
jury to conclude that the death of Phyllis
Ady involved criminal activity (the corpus
delicti), the evidence was not sufficient to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant caused Phyllis Ady's death. Even
if the evidence proved that defendant
caused her death, it was manifestly insufficient to prove that he did so Hintentionally
or knowingly," as was charged in this complaint for murder in the second degree.
U.C.A., 1953, § 76-5-203(lXa)
The conviction is reversed and the defendant is ordered discharged from custody.
STEWART and HOWE, JJi concur.
I. The record shows that Perkins had resided
between the lot where the skeleton was found
and the McDonald's restaurant J whose parking
lot abutted that lot in the rear (along the fence
line by the pit) In rebuttal, the prosecution
showed that Perkins had a record of narcotics
offenses, that his place of residence had been
torn down the preceding August, and that he
had moved awav from Cedar C ty prior to that
time. The prosecution introduced a "mug
shot" of Perkins, and the witness who had
mentioned him (Phylhs's girl friend) was unable to identif\ it
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HALL, Chief Justice (dissenting):
I premise my dissent upon the following
time-honored rule of appellate review:
It is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses, and it is not
within the prerogative of this Court to
substitute its judgment for that of the
factfinder.1 [Emphasis added.]
The main opinion reaches a conclusion contrary to that of the jury and trial court by
substituting the judgment of this Court, as
to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence for that of the jury, in direct contravention of the foregoing.
The standard of review to which this
Court is bound when faced with insufficiency of evidence claims was very recently
stated in State v. McCardell*
This Court will not lightly overturn the
findings of a jury. We must view the
evidence properly presented at trial in the
light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
and will only interfere when the evidence
is so lacking and insubstantial that a reasonable man would not possibly have
reached a verdict beyond a reasonable
doubt. We also view in a light most
favorable to the jury's verdict those facts
which can be reasonably inferred from
the evidence presented to it. "Thus, intent to commit [a crime] . .. may be
found from proof of facts from which it
reasonably could be believed that such
was defendant's intent." [Citations omitted.]
This Court also adheres to the general
appellate rule that a trial court's judgment
has a presumption of validity in an appellate court. We held in Burton v. Zions
Cooperative Mercantile Institution?
There is a presumption that the judgment
of the trial court was correct, and every
reasonable intendment must be indulged

in favor of it; the burden of affirmatively showing error is on the party complaining thereof.
I have no quarrel with the proposition
that this Court has the prerogative to determine the sufficiency of the evidence. However, in doing so, the main opinion fails to
follow the more fundamental rule that requires us to view the evidence and all inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most
favorable to the jury verdict. Rather, it
assumes the role of fact-finder, surveying
the evidence in the record and drawing
therefrom independent conclusions as to its
weight, sufficiency and effect. Such is not
the role of this Court.
The main opinion concludes that a relationship did not exist between defendant
and the victim by reason of the fact that
defendant had visited the victim's home on
only one occasion prior to December 12,
1977. This conclusion does not reflect a
view of the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. The fact that
defendant's "one" visit occurred the very
day before the victim disappeared could
reasonably have prompted the jury to infer
that some form of relationship was developing or had developed between defendant
and the victim.
In an attempt to cast doubt as to defendant's being the perpetrator of the offense,
the defense presented evidence that Miss
Ady's plans on the evening of her disappearance included a visit to one Ken Perkins. The defense intended thereby to implicate Ken Perkins as the person described
by defendant as having long, blonde hair,
with whom the victim allegedly left on the
eve of her disappearance.
The testimony regarding Ken Perkins
was shown to be unreliable and inconsequential, and therefore apparently disbelieved by the jury.4 Inasmuch as this was

1. State v Lamm. Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231
(1980).

3. 122 Utah 360, 259 P.2d 514, 518(1952). See
also People v. Miller, 78 Cal.Rptr. 449. 78 Cal.
Rptr. 449. 455 P 2d 377 (1969).

2. Utah, 652 P 2d 942 (1982). See also State v.
Romero, Utah. 554 P.2d 216 (1976); State v.
Lamm, supra n. 1.

4. Christa AJlred's testimony, being the only testimony regarding Miss Ady's acquaintance
with Ken Perkins, was countered by the following: The State showed that the house where
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the only evidence presented by the defense
of an alternative suspect, and it failed, defendant, being the last person positively
seen with the victim, was left as the only
possible and viable suspect. Therefore, contrary to the conclusion reached in the main
opinion, the failure of defendant's evidence
to implicate Perkins does add strength to
the evidence against defendant as the
perpetrator of the crime.
The State's evidence showed that defendant abruptly left town the very day the
victim was reported missing. According to
the record, defendant called his sister in Las
Vegas, Nevada, on the night of December
12, 1977, at approximately 8:00 p.m. (only
two hours after he had been seen with the
victim), and again on the following morning. He told her of his distressful situation
at home and at school and asked her if she
would come at once and get him. She
drove from Las Vegas that very day (December 13), and took defendant back to her
home, where he remained until he was returned to Cedar City by his older brother
four days later.
The unexplained and undisputed evidence
of defendant's departure from Cedar City
immediately following the victim's disappearance gives rise to an inference of his
guilt.5 This Court has held:
Flight and concealment immediately
following the commission of a crime are
both elements which may be considered
as evidence of implication in that crime.6
The jury could therefore draw an inference
of guilt from defendant's abrupt departure
from the state.
Perkins had resided had been torn down since
early August, 1977, and that Perkins had left
Cedar City sometime prior to that date. The
State also introduced into evidence a mug shot
of Perkins, which was identified by the Cedar
City Police Chief. Miss Allred, having been
called to the witness stand once and having
then testified that she knew who Perkins was
and what he looked like, was called back to the
stand and asked if she could identify the person
in the mug shot. She could not. Her failure to
identify the individual as Perkins cast a shade
of unreliability on her information and testimony regarding him. Furthermore, the mug shot
revealed Perkins' hair color to be black, thus
precluding an inference that Perkins was the

The main opinion draws thje conclusion
that defendant's statements to his relatives
concerning the content and puse of his
nightmares were not actual admissions, but
rather were mere accounts of dreams bearing insufficient weight to support an inference of defendant's guilt. However, it is
not this Court's prerogative to draw such
conclusions and thereby substitute its judgment as to the weight and sufficiency of
evidence for that of the jury. The jury,
upon weighing the testimony regarding defendant's statements in conjunction with
the other evidence, deemed the statements
to be supportive of the inference of guilt.
Furthermore, the conclusion that defendant's statements were mere accounts of
dreams, rather than of an actual occurrence, is not sup|>orted by the record, nor
does it reflect a review of the facts in "a
light most supportive of the findings of the
trier of fact." Also, the main opinion assumes that the accounts of his dreams could
not, under any circumstances give rise to
an inference of guilt. Here again, it is not
for this Court to make such an assumption.
Particularly is this so under (he facts and
circumstances of this case.
A thorough and exacting rjeview of the
record, in a light most favorable to the jury
verdict, reveals certain nconsistencies and
inaccuracies in the analysis of| the evidence
defendant's
in the main opinion regardi
statements. The first witness! to testify ot
defendant's confessions was James Back7
stoce, the defendant's brother- in-law. The
same person described by defendant as the one
with whom he last saw the victim.
5.

See State v. Hardison, N.M.App., 467 P.2d
1002 (1970); State v. McCormlck, 28 Or.App.
821, 561 P.2d 665 (1977).

6.

State v. Simpson, 120 Utah I 596, 236 P.2d
1077. 1079 (1951). See also Sthte v. Marasco.
81 Utah 325, 17 P.2d 919 (1933^

. The pertinent part of Mr Back stoce s testimony reads as follows:
Q. Mr. Backstoce. again, wlhht was said and
by whom at this conversation
A. The things we were cjiscussing with
Johnny and, of course, the ^ir^f that was missinn And during the discussipn
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main opinion quotes Mr. Backstoce's testimony and states that it "clearly refers solely to the defendant's explanation of the
dream that had awakened him." This
statement is not accurate. Mr. Backstoce
indicated that defendant, himself and his
wife (defendant's sister) had a discussion
concerning the missing girl (Phyllis Ady)
after being awakened by one of defendant's
nightmares. In the context of that discussion, i.e., regarding Phyllis Ady, Mr. Backstoce testified that defendant related to
them the following condemning statement:
"Well, John [defendant] said that he was
walking the girl home and the girl slapped
him and that was the last thing he remembered till he woke up taking a bath in the
tub." Contrary to the conclusion reached in
the main opinion, no mention at all was
made of dreams. The statements in the
conversation refer to an actual occurrence,
and Phyllis Ady is definitely the subject of
the conversation.
The next witness called by the State to
testify concerning defendant's statements
was Alisa Backstoce, defendant's sister.8
Although the main opinion concludes that
her testimony refers entirely to the content
of the defendant's dreams, it admits that
part of her testimony could be interpreted
to refer to an actual occurrence. Mrs.
Backstoce's testimony regarding the conversation between herself, her husband and
defendant at the kitchen table after his
second nightmare, is for the most part consistent with that of her husband. However,
unlike her husband's testimony, she refers
to the matter as a dream. It is noted, also,
that her testimony includes an additional
part of the dream that Mr. Backstoce did
Q. Okay, would you please tell us who said
what.
A. Well, John said that he was walking the
girl home and the girl slapped him and that
was the last thing he remembered till he
woke up taking a bath in the tub. [Emphasis
added.]
8. Mrs. Backstoce's testimony, in pertinent part,
reads:
Q. Mrs. Backstoce, can you tell me in substance and effect what was said and by
whom in this conversation around your
kitchen table?

not mention: the girl's folks had come to
defendant's house searching for her. This
correlates with the fact that Mrs. Westman
went to the defendant's house on the eve of
December 12 in search of Phyllis Ady.
Perhaps the most important part of Mrs.
Backstoce's testimony is that part which the
main opinion regards as being subject to
interpretation that it refers to an actual
occurrence. After her account of her
brother's statements concerning his nightmares, Mrs. Backstoce was asked if the
defendant said anything else about the girl.
Her answer was: "Later he said he thought
he had hurt or killed a girl, but he wasn't
sure." (Emphasis added.) This statement,
when considered in light of Mr. Backstoce's
testimony that the conversation at the
kitchen table involved the "missing girl,"
could reasonably and justifiably be interpreted as referring to an actual occurrence
involving the victim. Notwithstanding this
interpretation is most consistent with the
jury's verdict, and furthermore is acknowledged by the main opinion, it is rejected by
the Court.
The third witness to testify regarding the
alleged admissions was the defendant's
brother, Robert Petree. Robert Petree,
who was living in California at the time of
the incident, was contacted by the Cedar
City Police and questioned as to the whereabouts of his brother, the defendant. He
was informed that his brother was being
sought out for questioning regarding the
disappearance of Phyllis Ady, and he
pledged his assistance in finding his brother
and returning him to Cedar City.
A. We asked Johnny what his nightmares
was about. He said he was having a nightmare about walking with a girl and she
slapped him and that's all he remembered,
and then waking up taking a bath and her
folks, the girl's folks pounding on the door
wanting to know where she was.
Q. Ail right. Did he say anything else about
the girl, other than just what you've told us?
A. Later he said he thought he had hurt or
killed a girl, but he wasn't sure. [Emphasis
added.]
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He eventually found his brother at his
sister's house in Las Vegas, Nevada. Upon
confronting defendant, he told him that the
police were searching for him in connection
with the Phyllis Ady disappearance and
that he was going to have to return to
Cedar City. Defendant expressed his unwillingness to return.
In defendant's presence, his sister told
Robert Petree about the nightmares. A
conversation then ensued between defendant and Robert. Robert did not ask him
specifically about the dreams; he rather
asked him what was bothering him. (Keep
in mind that Robert had just informed defendant that the |x>lice were searching for
him in connection with the Phyllis Ady matter.) Defendant's response, as Robert relates it, was not in reference to a dream at
this point in the conversation.9 Walking
through the field, being slapped and blacking out appear to be the facts. After these
facts are stated, the account of the dreams
begins.10 The account is incoherent and
consequently very difficult to interpret.11
It is not clear whether defendant blacked
out in his dream or blacked out and then
began to dream. The State argued that the
black out occurred at the time defendant
killed Phyllis Ady, and that the dreams that
he had hurt or possibly killed her were mere
fill-ins of the actual event. This reasoning
is conceivable, especially in light of the testimony given by Debra Wilson concerning a
later statement made by defendant, which
was totally unrelated to the dreams, infra.
9.

"Well, he proceeded to tell me that he was
walking through a field with—I took it as a
young girl. He didn't say what girl or who it
was, but she slapped him. He blacked out.
And then he goes on from there to say about
the dreams."

10. "And then he goes on from there to say
about the dreams." (Emphasis added.)
11. "What he told me about the dream, that
when he blacked out and he started to dream
that he—his words were he thought he hurt
her. He thought he might have killed her."
(Emphasis added.)
12. The relevant portion of Miss Wilson's testimony is as follows.

451

The main opinion emphasizes the fact
that on cross-examination, Robert Petree
told defense counsel that his testimony was
the account of a dream that defendant had.
However, the foregoing analysis of his testimony, being an analysis favoring the
jury's verdict, reveals that only a part of his
answers actually referred to the defendant's dreams; the remainder were clearly
outside the dream context.
Also proffered by the State as an admission of defendant's guilt was a statement
he made to Debra Wilson.12 Miss Wilson
had dated defendant in 1979 and 1980 while
he was living in California. She testified
that he told her he had gotten into a fight
with a girl in Utah, and that he had gone
home afterwards and could not remember
anything. No mention was made of any
dreams. Defendant simply related the incident as an actual occurrence.
The main opinion considers Debra Wilson's testimony to be inconsequential, and
furthermore, determines that it "adds nothing of substance on this issue." I cannot
agree. When considered along with the
testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Backstoce and
Robert Petree, and when viewed in a light
most favorable to the jury's verdict, it reasonably supports an inference of defendant's guilt. Because there was no doubt
that defendant was relating an actual occurrence to Debra Wilson, it would have
been reasonable for the jury to conclude
that defendant's statements to the other
three witnesses concerning an altercation
with a female and a black out, or lapse of
Q. Again, Miss Wilson, can you tell me in
substance and effect what was said and by
whom in this conversation
A. He had told me that he had gotten in a
fight with a girt in Utah. He didn't mention
any names. And he came home and he
couldn't remember nothing aftenvards.
Q. All right, did he say anything else about
what condition he was in when he came
home?
A. Just that he remembered getting in a
fight and I guess he had blood on his shirt;
that was what was mentioned, and he
couldn't remember nothing. [Emphasis add-
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memory, were not mere products of his
imagination derived from dreams, but rather actual admissions of definite occurrences.
To sustain such a conclusion would certainly
not require undue stretching of the evidentiary fabric.
Although it is not absolutely clear from
the record that all of defendant's statements referred to an actual occurrence, it
was clear beyond a reasonable doubt to the
jury, as they sat and listened first hand to
the witnesses, that these statements, be
they accounts of dreams, actual occurrences
or a mixture of both, implicated defendant
as the perpetrator of the homicide. This
Court has noted that:
[I]t is not the function of an appellate
court to make findings of fact because it
does not have the advantage of seeing
and hearing the witnesses testify.13 [Emphasis added.]
Accordingly, this Court should adopt an interpretation of these statements consistent
with the jury's findings and ultimate verdict.
A fact wholly ignored by the main opinion, yet one which definitely lends credence
to the trial court's judgment, is that defendant was known to have an explosive
temper. Mr. Paul Jeffries, a tenant at defendant's home, gave testimony of this fact
on behalf of the State. This fact, coupled
with the foregoing admissions, permits an
inference that when defendant was slapped
by the victim he lost his temper, reacted
violently and took the victim's life.
In conclusion, the main opinion suggests
that even if the evidence were sufficient to
prove that defendant caused Phyllis Ady's
death, it is not sufficient to prove that he
did so "intentionally or knowingly," as required for a conviction of second degree
murder.
13. Rucker v Dalton, Utah, 598 P2d 1336, 1338
(1979) See also Mendelson v Roland. 66 Utah
487, 243 P 798(1926)
14. See State v Murph\. Utah, 617 P2d 399
(1980), State v Kennedy, Utah, 616 P 2d 594
(1980), State v Coole\, Utah, 603 P2d 800
(1979)

This Court recognizes the elementary
principle of criminal law that specific intent
may and ordinarily must, be proven by circumstantial evidence.14 An appropriate and
recent articulation of this rule is:
[I]ntent may be proven and often must be
proven in criminal prosecution by circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. The
weight to be ascribed to such evidence is
a determination within the province of
the jury.15
This is not a case of first impression in
this jurisdiction.16 The law in Utah, as well
as in most jurisdictions, clearly permits a
conviction of second degree murder and
proof of the elements thereof based on inferences drawn from surrounding circumstances.17 The issue is simply whether the
facts surrounding this case and the evidence
proffered by the State provided the jury
with a reasonable basis from which to draw
such inferences.
In the instant case, the State showed that
Phyllis Ady's body was forced into the carrot pit in a reverse fetal position and partially buried to avoid detection. These
facts certainly permit a reasonable inference that defendant's conduct was animated by the specific intent necessary for
second degree murder. Furthermore, Paul
Jeffries, a tenant at defendant's home, testified that defendant had an explosive temper. This fact, coupled with defendant's
admissions in which a girl had slapped him,
would support a reasonable inference that
at the moment he was slapped, and in his
anger, he formed the intent to kill Phyllis
Ady or knew that his subsequent conduct
would result in her death. Viewing the
evidence and reasonable inferences there15. State v Wilkins, 1 Hawaii App 546. 622
P2d 620, 624 (1981)
16. State v Canfield, 18 Utah 2d 292. 422 P2d
196 (1967)
17. Id See also State v Wilktns, supra n 16,
State v Woods. 222 Kan 179. 563 P2d 1061
(1977)
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from, as well as the inference that an actor
generally intends the ultimate consequences
of his acts,18 in a light favorable to the jury
verdict, defendant has simply failed to show
that the evidence was "so inconclusive or
insubstantial that a reasonable person must
have entertained a reasonable doubt" that
the State proved intent for second degree
murder. Therefore, the jury verdict and
the judgment rendered thereupon should be
left undisturbed.
!8.

State v Walton, Utah, 646 P.2d 689 (1982).

I would affirm the judgment and sentence of the trial court.
DURHAM, J., concurs in he dissenting
opinion of HALL, C.J.
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consider whether and under what circumstances recusal may be required in administrative adjudications when the specific provisions of section 54-7-1.5 do not apply.
Plainly, having participated in a rule making proceeding does not automatically preclude a commissioner from participating in
a later, properly conducted adjudication.
We have considered the other issues
raised and find their disposition unnecessary to the result. The Commission's rule
is of no force and effect, and its order is
vacated. The matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.

whose vehicles are presently immobile because of mechanical trouble, and (2) driver's refusal to submit to breath test upon
rumors that there had been incidents of
tampering with breathalyzer in the past
was nevertheless refusal, subjecting defendant to license revocation.
Affirmed.
1. Automobiles $^144.2(9)
In revocation proceeding, Driver Division has burden to show that operator of
vehicle was in actual physical control of
motor vehicle and that arresting officer
had grounds to believe that operator was
under influence of alcohol.
2. Automobiles <$== 144.2110)
In trial de novo, district court must
determine by preponderance of evidence
whether driver's license was subject to revocation for driving under the influence of
alcohol. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10.

Jose Antonio LOPEZ, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Fred C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, Driver
License Services, Utah Department of
Public Safety, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 20112.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 12, 1986.
Utah State Driver License Division revoked driving privileges of driver for period of one year. The Seventh District
Court, Carbon County, Richard C. Davidson, J., affirmed the administrative decision. Driver appealed. The Supreme
Court, held that: (1) statute providing for
arrest of one "in actual physical control" of
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
and/or drugs was intended by legislature
to protect public safety and apprehend
drunken driver before he or she strikes and
may not be construed to exclude those

3. Automobiles «= 144.2(3)
Supreme Court's review of district
court's determination as to whether driver's license was subject to revocation for
driving while under the influence of alcohol
is deferential to trial court's view of evidence unless trial court has misapplied
principles of law or its findings are clearly
against weight of evidence.
4. Automobiles <S=>144.1(1)
Even if truck was inoperable at time
that licensee was found sleeping in it and
arrested, that would not preclude him from
having "actual physical control" over truck
so that his driver's license could be revoked
if he had statutorily prohibited blood alcohol content. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(1, 2).
5. Automobiles <3=>349
Statute providing for arrest of one "in
actual physical control" of vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs
was intended by legislature to protect public safety and apprehend drunken driver
before he or she strikes and may not be
construed to exclude those vehicles are
presently immobile because of mechanical
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trouble.
10(2).

U.C.A.1953, 41-2-19.5, 41-6-44.-

6. Automobiles <s= 144.2(10)
District court's findings that vehicle
had reached its point of rest under its own
power and that licensee had failed field
sobriety test, were supported by competent
evidence, and would not be disturbed by
Supreme Court.
7. Automobiles <®=»144.1(1)
Refusal to take breathalyzer test simply means that arrestee was asked to take
breath test decline to do so of his own
volition.
8. Automobiles <£=> 144.2(8)
Whether or not driver's refusal to take
breath test is conditional or reasonable
makes no difference; result is still license
revocation of one year. U.C.A.1953, 41-644.10.
9. Automobiles 3=144.1(1)
Refusal to answer yes or no to request
to taking breath test is still refusal, for
purpose of license revocation. U.C.A.
1953, 41-6-44.10.
10. Automobiles <s=»144.1(l)
Driver's licensee admitted that he had
been requested to submit to breath test
and that he had refused, invoking sanction
of revocation of his license. U.C.A.1953,
41-6-44.10.
11. Appeal and Error e=»181
Supreme Court will not review alleged
error when no objection at all is made at
trial level.
Phil L. Hansen, (Lopez), Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Bruce M.
Hale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent
PER CURIAM:
The Utah State Driver License Division
revoked the driving privileges of petitioner
Lopez for a period of one year pursuant to
U.C.A., 1953, § 41-6-44.10 (1981 ed.). Af-

ter a trial de novo, the trial court affirmed
the administrative decision. Lopez appeals
and contends: (1) it was error to find that
Lopez was in actual phys cal control of his
vehicle when he was asleep at the wheel
and the vehicle was inoperable; (2) his refusal to take a breath test, was reasonable;
and (3) it was error to al ow testimony on
Lopez's breath test refusal when Lopez did
not know that he was under arrest We
affirm.
At approximately 3:00 am. on March 18,
1984, Officers Anderson and Schofield
were separately dispatched to investigate a
prowler report. En route, Schofield was
flagged down by an individual who pointed
to Lopez's truck parked by a public telephone booth adjacent to Sunnyside City
Hall. The truck's motor was not running.
There were vehicle tracks from the pickup
in the freshly fallen snow. When Schofield
approached the truck, Lopez was sitting in
the driver's seat with his nead resting on
the steering wheel. Schofield tapped on
the window, assisted Lopez in opening the
door to talk to him, and had to catch him
when he fell more than stepped out of his
truck. Schofield smelled alcohol on Lopez's breath. Lopez was drooling, had
very poor balance, and needed support to
stand. When asked to produce a driver
license, Lopez initially handid the officer a
child's picture. Schofield removed the keys
from the ignition and had t<|) turn them to
get them out.
After Officer Anderson arrived, both officers asked Lopez to perform several field
sobriety tests, which he failed. Lopez at
one point stated, "Was I driv ng, I was just
waiting for a phone call." Lopez was
placed under arrest, handcuffed, and
placed in the patrol car. Both officers testified that Lopez asked several times what
he was arrested for. Officer Anderson
then requested Lopez to submit to a breath
test to determine the alcohol content in his
blood. Lopez responded, ' I took your
tests. I passed your tests.' Lopez was
transported to the sheriffs station, where
he was again asked to submit to the breath
test, was advised that he would be permit-
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ted to have an additional test administered
by a physician of his own choice, and was
warned that his refusal to submit to the
test could result in revocation of his license
for one year. Lopez did not respond.
At trial, Lopez stated for the first time
that his wife had been driving the truck
when the battery died. He had been waiting in the truck for her to bring thenar to
tow the truck home. He admitted that he
had not told the officers about any dead
battery or dead car. He admitted that he
understood that he had been arrested for
driving while under the influence. Lopez
also testified that he had refused the officer's request to take the breath test because he "didn't trust them" and that he
had conducted the field sobriety tests well'
enough to prove that he had not been
drinking. He also confirmed that he had
been told that he would lose his license if
he refused.
From the evidence so adduced, the trial
court found by a preponderance that there
was probable cause to arrest Lopez, that he
had been requested to take the breath test,
and that he had been warned of the consequences if there was a refusal. The court
found the arrest proper because Lopez was
alone in the car, had the keys to the vehicle, "there were tire tracks leading up to
the vehicle, the vehicle got there apparently on its own power," and Lopez had failed
the field sobriety tests.
[1-3J In a revocation proceeding, the
Driver License Division has the burden to
show that the operator of a vehicle was "in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle"
and that the arresting officer had grounds
to believe that the operator was then under
the influence of alcohol.
Garcia v.
Sckwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 652 (Utah
1982); Ballard v. State, 595 P.2d 1302
(Utah 1979). In a trial de novo, the district
court must determine by a preponderance
of the evidence "whether the petitioner's
license is subject to revocation undeif the
provisions of this chapter." §«41-$-44.10(2), supra; Garcia, 645 P.2d at 652. Our
review of that determination is deferential
to the trial court's view of the evidence

unless the trial court has misapplied principles of law or its findings are clearly
against the weight of the evidence. Id. at
653.
Lopez first argues that the Driver License Division failed to meet the statutory
requirements that he had "actual physical
control" of the vehicle when he was arrested. Section 41-6-44.10(1) reads in pertinent part:
Any person operating a motor vehicle in
this state shall be deemed to have given
his consent to a chemical test or tests of
his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining whether he was driving or in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle while having a blood alcohpl content statutorily prohibited, or
while under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or combination of alcohol and any
drug . . . so long as the test is or tests
are administered at the direction of a
peace officer having grounds to believe
that person to have been driving or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug
Lopez compares his situation to the facts
of State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 404, 483
P.2d 442 (1971), where the driver of the
vehicle had parked his car completely off
the road, had turned off the motor, and
was sleeping. Nothing in that case indicates that the driver was in the driver's
seat at the time he was found and arrested.
"Positioning in the driver's seat is an element common to all of the cases that have
found actual physical control of a motionless vehicle." State v. Smelter, 36 Wash.
App. 439, 674 P.2d 690 (1984). See also
Adams v. State, 697 P.2d 622 (Wyo.1985);
Huges v. State, 535 P.2d 1023 (Okla.Crim.
1975); but compare Bearden v. State, 430
P.2d 844 (Okla.Crim. 1967), where the driver
lay unconscious on the ground beside his
pickup truck. The courts upholding convictions in these and similar fact situations
start out from the premise that as long as
a person is physically able to assert domin-
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ion by starting the car and driving away,
he has substantially as much control over
the vehicle as he would if he were actually
driving it, Adams v. State, 697 P.2d at
625.
[4,5] Nonetheless, Lopez claims that
his car was inoperable at the time of his
arrest and that the statutory burden was
therefore not borne by the Driver License
Division as he was unable to start the car
and drive it away. We note initially that
Lopez first told this version of the events
leading to his arrest when he took the
stand in his trial de novo. No substantiating evidence was offered to buttress his
assertion. Under the circumstances, the
trial court may well have disbelieved him
and given little weight to his testimony.
Assuming arguendo that Lopez's truck
was indeed disabled, jurisdictions with similar statutes as ours have nonetheless
found "actual physical control" of the driver over the disabled car. The rationale was
forcefully voiced in State v. Smelter, 674
P.2d at 693:
The focus should not be narrowly upon
the mechanical condition of the car when
it comes to rest, but upon the status of
its occupant and the nature of the authority he or she exerted over the vehicle
in arriving at the place from which, by
virtue of its inoperability, it can no longer move. Where, as here, circumstantial
evidence permits a legitimate inference
that the car was where it was and was
performing as it was because of the defendant's choice, it follows that the defendant was in actual physical control.
To hold otherwise could conceivably allow an intoxicated driver whose vehicle
was rendered inoperable in a collision to
escape prosecution.
Citing Commonwealth v. Taylor, 237 Pa.
3uper.212, 352 A.2d 137 (1975). Utah's
statute provides for the arrest of one "in
tctual physical control" of the vehicle while
mder the influence of alcohol and/or
Irugs. That requirement was intended by
ur legislature to protect public, safety and
pprehend the drunken driver^before he or
he strikes, § 41-2-1.9.5; Garcia, 645 P.2d

at 654; accord Ballard v. State, supra,
and may not be construed to exclude those
whose vehicles are presently immobile because of mechanical trouble. \State v.
Smelter, supra.
[6] The trial court here foJind that
there were tire tracks leading up to the
vehicle, that the vehicle had to have
reached its point of rest "apparently on its
own power," and that Lopez had failed the
field sobriety tests. Those findings are
supported by competent evidence |and will
not be disturbed by this Court.
[7-10] At trial, Lopez based his| refusal
to submit to a breath test upon the rumors
that there had been incidents of tampering
with the breathalyzer in the past His
retort to the officers at the scene was that
he had taken the tests and passed them. A
refusal simply means that an arrestee who
is* asked to take a breath test "declines to
do so of his own volition." Cavaness v.
Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (Utah 1979). Whither or
not that refusal is conditional makes no
difference. Id. Likewise, it makes no difference whether or not a refusal is reasonable. The result is still a license revocation
of one year. By the same token, a refusal
to answer yes or no to a request to take a
breath test is still a refusal. Beck v. Cox,
597 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1979). Lopez admitted
that he had been requested to submit to the
test and that he had refused. No more
was required to invoke the sanction pf the
statute. § 41-6-44.10(2), supra.
[11] We do not reach the merits of Lopez's claim that testimony on his refusal to
take the breath test was inadmissib e because he was not aware that he was under
arrest. Lopez's counsel did not object, but
actively solicited that testimony from Lopez on cross-examination. This Court will
not review alleged error when no objection
at all is made at the trial level. Sta\te v.
Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983).
The judgment is affirmed.
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